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Intellectual Culture: The End of Russian Intelligentsia
Dmitri Shalin
No group cheered louder for Soviet reform, had a bigger stake in
perestroika, and suffered more in its aftermath than did the Russian
intelligentsia. Today, nearly a decade after Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled his
plan to reform Soviet society, the mood among Russian intellectuals is
decidedly gloomy. "The intelligentsia has carried perestroika on its
shoulders," laments Ury Shchekochikhin, "so why does it feel so forlorn,
superfluous, forgotten"? [1] G. Ivanitsky warns that the intellectual strata
"has become so thin that in three or four years the current genocide
against the intelligentsia would surely wipe it out." [2] Andrey Bitov, one
of the country's finest writers, waxes nostalgically about the Brezhnev era
and "the golden years of stagnation when . . . people could do something
real, like build homes, publish books, and what not." [3]
The frustration and self-doubt afflicting Russian intellectuals today might
seem excessive but they are hardly unprecedented. In the last hundred
sixty years or so, every crucial turn in Russian history has touched off a
new round of debates about the intelligentsia, its role as the conscience of
society and the guardian of national culture. This discourse by and about
the intelligentsia has shaped Russian intellectual culture with its distinct
themes, literary props, psychological traits, and favored political agendas.
Russian intellectual culture shares with its Western counterpart the belief
in directed social change and cultural critique as a tool for social
reconstruction. East or West, intellectuals produce a "distinctive culture of
discourse" [4] through which they stake their claim to status and income
in a modern society. The greater the significance society assigns to the
written word, intellectual creativity, and social criticism, the greater
prestige and privilege the intelligentsia enjoys in society. Keeping aflame
critical discourse and promoting high culture, therefore, the intelligentsia
also increases its cultural capital.
What sets Russian intellectual culture apart is a crying gap between its
modern aspirations and the nation's conservative heritage. Its other
distinctive feature is the bold, even extravagant, manner in which Russian
intellectuals have asserted their vanguard role and claimed moral
leadership in society. As Alexander Yanov, a prominent Russian
intellectual, put it, "One advantage that Russia has over the West is its
colossal intellectual wealth." [5] The implication is that if only the Russian
intelligentsia could deploy its intellectual resources fully, reforms in their
ocuntry would have a chance. This sentiment is shared by many Russian

intellectuals who continue to search for ways to mobilize culture as a
strategic national resource and, in the process, improve their own sinking
fortunes.
Whatever their vested interests, intellectuals' yen for stewardship in a
rapidly changing Russian society should not be treated lightly. The
ongoing discourse about the intelligentsia and its role in current reforms
has left a mark on public consciousness and found its way into wider social
practice. The question is where the intelligentsia would like to take the
nation, and whether the nation is willing to follow its intelligentsia.
To understand intellectual discourse in today's Russia , we need to
examine Russian intellectual culture in its formative years. [6] After
tracing the origins of the Russian intellectual tradition, I outline its
evolution in the Soviet era. Next, I address the challenges that the
intelligentsia faces in post-Soviet Russia , the stunning reversal of
fortunes that Russian intellectuals have suffered in recent years, and their
struggle to reassert their critical role in society. And finally, I offer some
speculations about the Russian intelligentsia's future.
The Origins of Russian Intellectual Culture
Although the Russian intelligentsia did not evolve into a self-conscious
social force until the mid-19th century, its origins can be traced to the
early 18th century, when Peter the Great embarked on a crash campaign
to modernize Russia . Backward, insular, and largely illiterate, Russia was
to be brought abreast with the leading European nations through radical
reforms in its political, religious, military, and civil service structures. To
that effect, Peter I invited to Russia experts from all over Europe, sent
young men abroad for study, set up a civil service bureaucracy,
reorganized the army and the navy on Western models, established the
Russian Academy of Science, and encouraged court poets to immortalize
the Tsar's glorious deeds. This forced Westernization exposed the country
to the ideas that had no roots in Russia proper and that were met with
resistance from the noblemen, many of whom saw the reforms as an
affront to Russian Orthodoxy and considered Peter the Great an antiChrist. But the new class of servicemen and courtiers who owed their
fortunes to Peter the Great and his successors learned to appreciate the
new ways and prided themselves on being the purveyors of European
mores in their roughhewn homeland.
It would be wrong to assume that the proto-intellectual strata planted
during the Peter the Great's reign instantly produced Western-style

intellectuals sold on the ideals of religious tolerance, political liberty, and a
constitutional state. The ruthless manner in which Peter I imposed his
reforms on his countrymen was inimical to the Occidental humanistic
heritage with its signature belief in the dignity of every human being. Nor
was there any evidence that the Russian servicemen, clerics, academics,
and poets had any agenda of their own. Whatever their internal squabbles
and personal gripes against the powerful, the 18th century bureaucrats by
and large identified with the state, its authoritarian domestic policies and
imperial aspirations abroad.
As the century wore on, signs began to emerge that the Westernized
intellectual strata was coming into its own and growing uneasy about
Russia 's backwardness. Catherine II's interest in the French
Enlightenment encouraged Russian writers to voice their judgments about
the country's social and political affairs. But when some dared to shed
their roles as official bards and court wits and venture an opinion mildly
critical of her majesty's realm, they were sternly reprimanded by the
Empress. Dissatisfaction with the serfdom that Vasily Kapnist cautiously
conveyed in one of his poems was met with a rebuke from Catherine II,
who told the writer to mind his own business and barred him from court.
Nikolai Novikov, a prominent publisher and educator in Catherine II's
reign, was sent to prison after he satirized Russia 's gentry. When
Western-educated Alexander Rudishchev wrote a book lamenting the
Russian peasants' sorry state, he was stripped of his nobleman's status
and sentenced to death (the verdict was later changed to a life-long exile
with the confiscation of property). [7]
During the reign of Alexander I, the gap between autocracy and the
Westernized strata grew wider. In 1812, Napoleon suffered a crushing
defeat. The Russian troops triumphantly marched into Paris . As it
happened, the occupiers fell under the spell of republicanism. Thirteen
years later, the young military commanders attempted to overthrow the
Tsar and replace autocracy with a constitutional monarchy -- an event
that dramatically underscored the extent to which Western ideals
permeated Russia 's educated class. The Decembrists' uprising, as this
event was called, failed miserably, but in the eyes of many
contemporaries and future commentators, it marked a watershed in
Russian history. The 1825 coup pinpointed the growing alienation between
Western-minded intellectuals and a nation still deeply ensconced in its
premodern ways, and it presaged the emergence of a politicallyconscious, socially up-rooted, and increasingly radical Russian
intelligentsia.

The French Enlightenment, German philosophy, and early socialist
teachings were among the most important Western currents that shaped
Russian intellectual culture in its formative years. To the Enlightenment,
Russian intellectuals owed their preoccupation with constitutional polity
and the republican system of government. German philosophy left its
mark on Russian intellectual discourse through a theory that hailed the
world historical spirit passing through several progressive stages and
elevating humanity to an imminently rational state. The socialist ideas
that began to reach Russia in the 1840s furnished fresh rationales for a
critique of Russia's backward economy and pervasive inequality.
The term "intelligentsia" has a Latin root and the Russian grammatical
form, suggesting a hybrid origin. George Fedotov, gives a precise date
when the intelligentsia was born: 1837, the year Alexander Pushkin died.
[8] Petr Boborykin claimed to have coined the term in 1866. [9] Its most
likely source is the Hegelian philosophy of spirit which envisioned a
superhuman intelligence operating in the universe and inexorably moving
society toward an ever more perfect state via the rationalizing activity of
self-reflexive minds. From this abstract philosophical doctrine, Russian
intellectuals inferred that their country had to be modernized in line with
world historical (read Western European) development and that the elite
of Western-educated, publicly-minded individuals was best suited for the
job. The Westernizers did not seem to be overly concerned that their
schemes had hardly any moorings in the Russian political tradition. They
had little doubt that their intelligence, theoretical savvy, and boundless
energy will surmount the historical obstacles in their path. Hence Georgy
Fedotov's famous definition: "The Russian intelligentsia is a group,
movement, and tradition that is marked by the principled nature of its
objectives and the groundlessness of its principles." [10] The arrogant
stance that the Westernized intellectuals assumed with regard to their
own cultural heritage had a direct impact on their psychology and
behavior. Having sided with progress, Russian intellectuals could not help
but feel superior to their society. With the native tradition cast as a fetter
on their enlightened spirit, they were apt to scorn as a retrograde any
person who saw something valuable in Russia 's past. Self-appointed
agents of history, they treated all mundane authorities and institutions
with contempt and vowed to destroy them. Alas, being ahead of one's
time proved exceedingly costly, as critically thinking intellectuals
discovered in their struggle with Russia 's formidable secrete police called
upon to crush the enemies of the state.
The critical intellectual ferment is already evident in Peter Chaadaev, a
celebrated 19th century intellectual whose robust critique of Russia 's

insular ways and longing for European culture so much angered Nicholas I
that he pronounced Chaadaev a "madman" -- the first, though hardly the
last, case of its kind in the Russian intelligentsia's beleaguered history.
Taking his cue from Schelling, Chaadaev extolled "universal intelligence,"
"universal reason," "one single intellectual force in the whole universe,"
and "the unique vision of the future granted to some chosen men" whose
selfless labors were enlisted to impart the world historical wisdom to
reality. [11] Chaadaev's views were unabashedly elitist: I have always
thought that humanity could advance only by following its elite, by
following those who have the mission of leading it; . . . that the instincts
of majorities are necessarily more egotistical, more emotional, more
narrow . . . that human intelligence always manifests itself most
powerfully only in the solitary mind, center and sun of its sphere. [12]
Once the task of universal intelligence was fully comprehended,
everything had to submit to its impersonal dictate. The individual was but
a vehicle for divine providence, his private existence largely irrelevant in
the face of the universal spirit's transhistorical agenda: "[T]he human
being should be understood once and for all as an intelligent being in
abstraction, but never as the individual and personal being, circumscribed
by the present moment, an ephemeral insect, which is born and dies on
the same day, and which is linked with the totality of things merely by the
law of birth and corruption." [13] From now on, every person's objective
value was to be judged by his readiness to subordinate his private urges
to universal reason and to fulfill its ultimate goal.
Having set for himself and his contemporaries this lofty ideal, Chaadaev
quickly discovered how hard it was to live up to it. In 1836, after his
philosophical letters incurred the Tsar's wrath, Chaadaev found himself
hounded by the police and shunned by the public. Hastily, he renounced
his views and retreated into proud solitude. Later on, when Alexander
Herzen, another prominent Russian intellectual, praised Chaadaev as a
precursor of free thought in Russia , Chaadaev dispatched a letter to the
political police headquarters where he denounced his compatriot and in
the most abject terms swore his loyalty to the Tsar. Asked why did he
have to abase himself so, he replied that one simply "must save one's
skin." [14] This surrender had its emotional toll on Chaadaev, who had
foreseen the crushing burden that the intellectual would bear in this Godforsaken land: "Where is the man who would be strong enough not to end
up hating himself, living in eternal contradiction, always thinking one thing
and doing another. . . . What causes this terrible ulcer which is destroying
us?" [15] This "terrible ulcer" would eat away at several generations of
Russian intellectuals daring to oppose the powerful state. Few would suffer

more from it than Chaadaev's friend, Russia 's beloved poet, Alexander
Pushkin.
Educated in the state-run lyceum for noblemen, Pushkin imbibed in his
formative years free thinking that would lead his friends to the Senate
plaza, the famous place in St. Petersburg where the Decembrists staged
their abortive coup. Pushkin did not mince words in his early lyrics, which
breathed regicidal fervor:
You, scoundrel autocratic!
I hate thy throne and I hate thee.
My heart feels cruelly ecstatic
When your and your's doom I foresee. [16]
His contemporaries remembered Pushkin in his young adulthood as an
irreverent, Jacobin spirit who did not mince words vilifying the
government: "At the governor's [mansion], on the streets, at the plaza,
he was always eager to explain to anybody that he who did not want to
change the government was a scoundrel. His conversation was replete
with cursing and sarcasm, and even his courtesy was punctuated with an
ironic smile." [17] Despite his radicalism, the poet's political preferences
were rather modest: he was ready to settle for a constitutional monarchy.
Rulers! your laurels and your crowns accrue
To your estate from law and not from nature;
You hover high and mighty over nations,
Alas, eternal law reigns over you [18].
Even in the liberal reign of Alexander II (the Tsar himself at one point
toyed with the idea of constitutional monarchy), such rhetoric was
deemed to be highly inflammatory. The Tsar had little use for a poet who
dared to put him on notice that
I cannot force my bashful muse
Tsars and their courtiers to amuse. [19]
Pushkin's verses, widely circulated and popular among future
Decembrists, landed him in exile, from which the poet would not escape
until after the failed Decembrists' uprising.
After Alexander I died in 1825, his son, Nicholas I, ascended to the
throne. Before he brought Pushkin back from exile, he ordered him, along
with a few other free thinkers, to write a report on the linkage between

youth education and pernicious republicanism, effectively inviting the poet
to repent for his own youthful indiscretions. Pushkin's reply was
emblematic of the torturous exercises that Russian intellectuals would
have to go through to save their skins without completely dishonoring
themselves. He charged his friends with "criminal delusions" and "low
morals," blamed "foreign ideologism" and "deficient education" for their
"wanton behavior," called for "drastic measures" to stem free thinking
among Russian youth, and demanded "the end to home schooling" which
lets youngsters escape the state's "omniscient oversight. [20] At the same
time, he intimated that harsh censorship might have driven honorable
men to clandestine publications, that it was better to expose the youth to
republican ideas in school than make them yield to hostile agitation later
on, and that the person's rank in society ought to be made commensurate
with his education -- quite nonorthodox ideas, given the period's
reactionary tenore.
About the same time, as if to calm his guilty conscience, Pushkin wrote
one of his best known verses which he dedicated to his comrades exiled to
Siberia:
Deep down in the Siberian mines
Sustain your proud, silent patience,
Your anguished toil will slowly grind,
Your noble dreams won't vanish traceless.
Confidently, Pushkin predicted that the time would come when
Your heavy fetters will fall off,
The walls of prisons crumble -- and freedom
Will greet you at the gates,
As friends restore your swords to you. [21]
These words are familiar to all Soviet school children. Much less known is
Pushkin's other side, his secret dealings with the authorities, his endless
entreaties to the chef of Russia's secret police: "If the emperor wishes to
use my pen, I would be eager, according to my abilities and with requisite
precision, to fulfill his highness's will. . . . I offer my magazine to the
government -- as its tool for shaping public opinion." [22] And this is from
the man who confessed that he was "tired to depend on the good or bad
digestion of one superior or another. . . . The only thing I crave is
independence." [23] And again: "What a devil's jest to force me, with my
mind and talent, to be born in Russia!" [24] "Of course, I loath my
homeland from head to toe, though I feel annoyed when a foreigner

shares with me this feeling. But you, who is not on the leash," queried
Pushkin his friend, "how can you live in Russia ? If the Tsar granted me
freedom, I wouldn't stay a month around here." [25] No wonder that
trying to reconcile these conflicting sentiments, Pushkin became illtempered and depressed. The freedom from political demands was all an
artist should long for, according to mature Pushkin. Here is his much
quoted verse written in the poet's last year that sums up his
disillusionment:
I do not cherish your much touted rights
Which sets some heads to reeling.
I don't blame the Gods who have denied me
The sweet pleasure of disputing taxes and meddling
With tsars forever waging wars among themselves.
Why should I care if our press is free
To gull its readers, if watchful censorship
Thwarts noisy demagogues' ambitious designs.
All these, you see, are words, words, words.
Far better, nobler rights are dear to me;
Far more auspicious freedoms I am craving:
To bow to the Tsar, to bow to the people -What difference does it make? God be their judge.
To no one else
Accounting for my deeds, pleasing no other but myself,
Refusing for a prize to bend my neck, my conscience, my beliefs,
Wandering here and there as I alone see fit,
Standing in awe, admiring nature's sacred beauty,
Beholding artistry inspired flight, transfixed
In joy and gratitude by its eternal truth -Now, that is happiness! Those are the rights. . . .[26]
Toward the end of his life, Pushkin grew increasingly irritated with his old
friends and unhappy about the real and imaginary slights he had suffered
from Nicholas I and his servants who never believed in his conversion.
Several times he offered to resign from his lowly position in the court
hierarchy, but was discouraged to go through with his request. A
notorious skirt chaser, he found the tables turned on himself when
Georges Dantes, a dazzling Frenchman serving in the Russian army,
began to stalk his wife. The duel that followed left Pushkin mortally
wounded. On his deathbed, he pleaded with Nicholas I to forgive his
indiscretion, asking his friend Zhukovsky to "tell him that it's a pity I have
to die; I would have been his completely." [27] The autocrat struck a

noble pause, forgiving Pushkin his sins against the throne, paying off his
numerous debts, and promising to take care of his wife and children. The
foremost poet and intellectual of his time, Alexander Pushkin died a
broken man.
The First Intelligenty
Neither Chaadaev nor Pushkin saw themselves as intelligenty -- members
of the Russian intelligentsia. Both were firmly rooted in the estate system
and harbored class prejudices against the lower orders common at the
time. Most contemporary Westernizers resigned themselves to studying
the latest foreign theories among like-minded nobles. Stankevich,
Granovsky, Turgenev, Ogarev, Herzen -- the golden youth of the 1840's
gathered in small circles where free thinking continued to flourish in the
stifling atmosphere of Nicholas I rule. "What is, is right," pronounced the
reigning Hegelian wisdom, from which the Russian intellectuals concluded
that they must be patient, that universal spirit cannot be rushed, that no
order was ready to fall until it had exhausted its historical potential.
The revolutionary tide that swept Europe in the late 1840s washed on the
Russian shores socialist slogans which exploded Russia 's stagnant
culture. The case of Alexander Herzen, the brilliant socialist writer and one
of Russia 's first political exiles to the West, is most revealing here. Son of
a Russian nobleman and a wealthy French woman, Herzen was schooled
at his father's estate in a typically eclectic fashion, learning Latin, German
and French, reading Voltaire and Diderot, soaking up the republican spirit.
He enrolled at Moscow State University , where he joined a clique of youth
looking for ways to snub Russia 's hated institutions. The young men's
aversion to autocracy was awakened by the Decembrists' uprising and
fortified by the heavy dosage of Fourierism and Saint Simonism. In 1834,
the student group was exposed and its leaders exiled to the East, where
Herzen spent eight years, working in various provincial administrations
and learning more than he cared to about Russia 's retrograde customs.
After a return to Moscow engineered by his powerful friends, Herzen was
exiled one more time, came back again, and in 1847, under the pretext of
his wife's poor health, managed to leave Russia and never returned to his
homeland.
Residing alternatively in Switzerland, France, Italy, and finally London, he
took active part in the revolutionary upheavals that swept Europe from
1848 on, and in the process underwent what he called "perestroika of all
convictions." [28] He rejected German idealism as too abstract and
consecrated himself to socialism and materialism, convinced that science

and education could alleviate absolutism, foster equality, and deliver
humanity from its misery. While Herzen's passion for liberalism sometime
approached religious fervor, his caustic, brilliant mind continued to check
his intellections against reality, openly acknowledging wherever the
former exceeded his expectations:
Liberalism is the last religion , though its church is not other-worldly and
its theodicy is political; it stands firmly on the ground and allows no
mystical reconciliations; it has to reconcile itself with reality in deed. . . .
Liberalism exposed the chasm in all its nakedness; the sickly
consciousness of this chasm breeds irony and skepticism that mark the
modern man and help him sweep the remnants of past idols. Irony
conveys the disappointment that logical truth is not the same as historical
truth, that aside from dialectical development, truth has its passionate
and contingent development, that in addition to reason, truth also has its
romance. [29]
In the mid-50s, Herzen started a successful publishing venture, which
included his famous magazines "Kolokol" (The Bell) and "Voices from
Russia " where intellectuals could clandestinely publish their philippics
against the Tsarist state. The magazine issues were smuggled back to
Russia where they were widely read by the regime's proponents and
opponents, with the top courtiers boasting their familiarity with the latest
magazine articles. Herzen was among the very first in Russia to zero in
on glasnost as a pivot on which progressive reforms must turn. "Thanks to
censorship, we are unfamiliar with glasnost, which amazes, frightens, and
offends us. It is time for the comedians from the imperial secret police to
realize that sooner or later their actions, kept secret behind bars and
buried in cemeteries, will become known and their shameful deeds will be
revealed in their utter ugliness to the entire world." [30] This will be the
central theme of Herzen's magazine throughout its life span. "If we listen
carefully to public opinion," wrote an anonymous contributor to the first
issue, "we hear one demand: glasnost. If you read the underground
literature, we come across the same demand: glasnost. Now every fact
points out that the only way to fight today's evil is glasnost. . . . The
choice is between these two options: cruelty and glasnost. . . ." [31]
Herzen's own belief in the power of glasnost and enlightenment remained
unshaken throughout his life, but his hope to see liberal ideas triumph in
his lifetime gradually faded away. He was also profoundly disaffected with
the West and its bourgeois culture -- meshchanstvo, as the Russians
would call it contemptuously. All of Europe , in his estimation, split into
two competing and equally philistine camps: "[O]n the one hand, there

are philistine-proprietors anxious to hold on to their monopolies, on the
other -- propertyless philistines (meshchane), which strain to dispossess
their counterparts but do not have enough strength. That is to say, greed
on the one side, envy on the other." [32] So, there seemed to be little
hope for a rational, humane community anywhere in the world. As his
hopes waned, Herzen grew ironic, wistful, and sarcastic, as so many of his
Russian contemporaries who had placed stock in reason only to discover
that reality refused to submit to its dictates. Herzen's irritability and
unhappiness was exacerbated by personal misfortunes and family
problems, as well as generational shifts. The new crop of Russian
intellectuals found him too liberal and conciliatory. Indeed, toward the end
of his life, Herzen renounced revolutionary violence as inimical to
constructive social change. He did it just as the mood back home was
turning more belligerent. Herzen's final judgments read as a warning to
the coming generation of freedom fighters who failed to understand that
"civilization by the whip, liberation by the guillotine," would spell new a
tyranny: "Every cause that requires crazy, mystic, and fantastic means
will in the end breed crazy consequences along with the reasonable ones.
Clearly, this is not our path -- understanding and discussion are our only
weapon." [33]
Herzen's social origins and considerable family fortune might have
something to do with his political moderation. But for his successors who
could boast neither his pedigree nor his financial resources, moderation in
the fight for freedom and equality was no virtue. The new breed of
intellectuals known as raznochintsy (literally, people from different ranks)
came from diverse social and economic strata. The sons and daughters of
clergy, servicemen, teachers, or gentry -- one thing all these people had
in common was that they severed most of their ties with their social strata
and often maintained a threadbare economic existence. It is this new crop
of declasse intellectuals who came into their own in the 1850s and
blossomed in the 1860s that was for the first time identified as "the
Russian intelligentsia." While paying homage to their predecessors and
borrowing from them some insights, the new intellectuals spurned
noblemen-critics as dreamers, lost souls, or "superfluous people"
[34] incapable of linking their thoughts and deeds. Pushkin was for them
"not serious enough," "too much of an epicurean," "too harmonious by
nature to take on life's anomalies." [35] Ivan Turgenev, another nobleman
writer with liberal sensibilities and a penchant for compromise, also found
himself shunned by the progressively militant intellectuals.
Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and Dmitri
Pisarev are key figures who perfected an intellectual style that would

dominate high culture discourse in Russia until the early 20th century.
Here are some key themes and accents that marked their discourse and
gave Russian intellectual culture its unique historical flavor:
(1). A critical approach to every social event or institution that is judged
from the standpoint of how it fits into the progressive historical agenda.
(2). A moral maximalism or an expectation that
the intelligenty subordinate their private needs to public interests, treat
every person according to his contribution to the liberation process, and
do everything possible to hasten the arrival of a just society.
(3). A vanguardism that calls upon a few educated, conscientious,
critically-minded individuals to lead the toiling masses toward the final
battle against the oppressive and obsolete regime.
(4). An ideologically inspired compassion for the toiling classes and
oppressed groups who suffered under the autocratic regime without being
able to voice their grievances or understand what causes their pains.
(5). A programmatic commitment to political, social, and economic
equality as the historically most efficient and humane form of societal
existence.
(6). A readiness to resort to class violence as a necessary evil under the
conditions where the reactionary state suppresses glasnost and stifles
legitimate venues for social reconstruction.
(7). A split between word and deed, with the free word persecuted by the
defensive authorities acquiring the status of the ultimate deed.
(8). An ironic detachment in interpersonal relations and sarcastic attitude
toward all authorities, which highlighted the gap between the official roles
that the Russian intellectuals had to play in public and the ideal selves
they aspired to be.
(9). A principled opposition to bourgeois culture or meshchanstvo in all its
manifestations found in contemporary family life, relations between
friends, artistic tastes, etc.
(10). An exalted vision of art and literature as a powerful medium for
shaping public opinion and communicating to the masses socialist ideals

and ideologically sound attitudes toward the extant society.
This list is not exhaustive; a particular stylistic feature could be present or
absent in any given individual; but somewhere at the intersection of these
discursive traits emerged the 19th century intelligentsia's creed. The
change in the Russian intellectual style could be gleaned from
Dobroliubov's celebrated dictum:
[T]he mass of people who 'think that they are above the present reality' is
swelling year by year; perhaps, everybody will soon outgrow this reality.
[But] what we need now are not people who would 'raise us above reality'
but who would raise -- or teach us how to raise -- the very reality to the
level of the rational demands we make. In a word, we need people of
action and not just those withdrawn, epicurean, bent on theorizing
individuals. [36]
There was no consensus at the time, or for that matter at any other point
in Russian history, as to how reality could be brought in line with reason.
But the notion that political means alone might not suffice in bringing
about an emancipated society sank roots at this historical juncture. Take
Vissarion Belinsky, an iconic figure among the Russian intelligenty. He
started as a moderately conservative idealist, gradually moved toward left
Hegelianism with its maxim -- What is rational must be made actual, then
fell under the spell of Saint Simonism, and finally declared himself a social
radical. "The entire public foundation of our age requires a painstaking
review and radical perestroika," wrote Belinsky in 1840, and this
necessitates violence as a tool for social engineering: "It is ridiculous to
believe that [social change] could happen by itself, in a timely fashion,
without violent uprisings and bloodshed. People are so stupid that they
must be lead to happiness by force. . . . I am beginning to love mankind
according to Marat: to make the least part of it happy I seem to be ready
to destroy the rest of it with fire and sword." [37]
One should resist the temptation of reading too much into such
inflammatory rhetoric (Belinsky was no more bloodthirsty than the young
Pushkin). It must be judged against the backdrop of Nicholas I's
suffocating empire where every independent thought was met with police
crackdown, every free spirit faced ostracism and repression. To be sure,
Belinsky was exaggerating when he wrote, "I am mortified by this
spectacle of a society in which leading roles are given to scoundrels and
perfect mediocrities, while everything noble and talented is hauled away
to rot on an uninhabited island," [38] but he was no malicious slanderer,
and he certainly expressed an opinion current among his educated

contemporaries. We should also balance the intelligentsia's radical
declarations with its commitment to glasnost, art, and literature as vital to
social progress -- the commitment shared by nearly all Russian
intellectuals, even those strenuously opposed to violence, up until the late
1980's. "For us, the Russians," wrote Chernyshevsky, "literature and
poetry have a tremendous importance that is not matched anywhere in
the world. . . ." [39] The significance that the intelligenty assigned to
literature in the 1850's and 60's was far greater than the role they
reserved for violence.
For the public, literature is not something that makes it forget life's
worries, not a sweet daydreaming in comfortable chairs after a fat meal -no, from the standpoint of the public, literature is res publica, a public
cause, a great deed, the source of moral joy and exaltation. . . . Where
there is a public, the writing has national content. . . . Where there is a
public, there is public opinion. [40]
The mid-19th century intelligentsia's contribution to the cause of freedom
was mostly through literary criticism, which was just about the only semilegitimate (censorship remained strict throughout the 19th century) form
of critical discourse possible at the time. It is through a painstaking,
sometimes forced, occasionally brilliant critique of literary works, theater
performances, music events, painting exhibits, etc., that the Russian
public learned how to glean the Zeitgeist in artist's work. Through the
eyes of Belinsky, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky, and Pisarev, many loyal
Russians came to see corrupt state officials brought to life by Gogol's
satirical imagination, to empathize with the yearnings of superfluous
people like Lermontov's Pechorin and Ostrovsky's Oblomov, to discern the
new hard-edged intellectuals exemplified by Turgenev's Bazarov or
Chernyshevsky's Rakhmetov. The last type is particularly interesting, for it
embodied the qualities that Russian intellectuals valued in themselves.
"Rakhmetov can do without what is called personal happiness," wrote
Pisarev about a revolutionary hero pictured in Chernyshevsky's novel
"What is to be Done"; "he has no need to refresh his strength through a
woman's love, pleasant music, Shakespearian play, or a festive supper
with good friends. He has one weakness: a good cigar which he needs to
clear his thoughts. But even this pleasure is but a means for him: he
smokes not because he enjoys smoking but because smoking stimulates
his mental activity." [41] What is remarkable about such statements that
proliferated in this era is their cultivated ascetism and emotional selfrepression. There seemed to be no room left for private feelings in the
Russian intelligentsia's moral calculus; a person was not to be judged on
any other basis than his ideological convictions. We already saw a hint of

this antipersonalism in Chaadaev (though not in Pushkin, the
quintessential humanist!) who urged that the individual was but an
"abstraction" and "ephemeral insect" devoid of significance apart form his
preassigned place in the world historical drama. One senses even a
greater stringency in the self-imposed rigors of the intelligentsia. "The
death of the particular for the sake of the universal -- such is the universal
law," intoned Belinsky. "From now on, man is nothing for me; man's
beliefs are everything. Conviction is the only thing that can unite me with
people or turn me away from them." [42]
You need not be a psychiatrist to suspect that such vociferous opposition
to the private sphere and personal pleasures had something to do with the
profound emotional disturbances hobbling Russian intellectuals. This
emotional rigorism could be traced in part to the hiatus between the harsh
realities spawned by quasi-modern Russia and intellectuals' longing for
illusive Western liberties, between the communal bliss promised by
socialist theories and the punishing discipline imposed on recalcitrant
individuals by the Tsarist regime. Hence, the moralism, defensiveness,
self-loathing, and sarcasm directed toward everyone and everything
working for the status quo.
I find Herzen's testimony especially moving here. His passion for justice
never throttled his instinct for truth, his demanding attitude toward others
did not blind him to his personal shortcomings. His humanism is nowhere
more evident than in his brutally honest self-indictment where he
ruminates on the price he and his loved ones had to pay for his endless
struggles and sacrifices.
We were born to destroy, our business was to weed and tear down, and
for that purpose [we had to] negate and ironize -- but even now, after we
struck fifteen-twenty blows, we see that we built nothing, that we
educated nobody. The consequence -- or to put it bluntly -- punishment -can be seen in people surrounding us, in the relations inside our families - and most of all, in our children. [43]
Herzen's self-irony would be carried out by his successors into stinging
sarcasm and intolerance toward anyone who did not share their
convictions. Herzen spotted this personal style in the Russian intellectuals
who visited him abroad, such as Engelson and Nechaev, as well as his
fellow immigrant, Mikhail Bakunin. Here is his take on the Petrashevtsy, a
socialist circle busted by the Russian secret police in 1849:
This circle included people who were young, gifted, extremely clever and

educated, but also irritable, sickly, and broken. . . . Young emotions,
bright and cheerful in their origins, were pushed inside and replaced with
pride and jealous competitiveness. . . . They did not know what happiness
was, did not care to nurture it. Under the mildest pretext they struck back
ruthlessly and treated the people closest to them rudely. They did as
much damage and spoiled as many things with their irony as Germans did
with their sugary sentimentality." [44]
Needless to say, not all intelligenty personalized such qualities. Still, there
is enough evidence to be gleaned from their diaries, correspondence, and
writings to corroborate Herzen's testimony. [45] Bred into their bones and
calcified there, the rage against autocracy drove the intelligenty toward
endless self-sacrifices and martyrdom, but it also disfigured their personal
lives, cost happiness to their loved ones, and left a trail of bitterness in its
wake that no hope for a better future could erase.
Soul-Searching and Self-criticism Among Intellectuals
By the time the 1860s came to a close, Russian intellectual culture
acquired its familiar traits and every educated person aspiring to be
anintelligent started feeling its powerful pull. There was still the question
to be answered as to how Russian reality could be brought in line with
perceived historical demands. The intelligenty offered to lead the way, but
who would heed the call? According to one Decembrist, "a party of
masked men" pouncing on the regal cortege would suffice to set Russia on
its modern path. But as Mikhail Lunin (the memorable phrase was his) and
the Decembrists learned, remonstrating on the Senate plaza was not
nearly enough.
Then came the familiar saw: the toiling masses -- the people -- must be
roused and turned loose against their oppressors. In the 1870s, the young
populists took to the countryside where they tried to persuade the
peasants that their conditions were much too harsh and that they ought to
rise and make their voice heard. The people were to be lead by "the
critically thinking personality that understood itself as a possible and
necessary agent of human progress." [46] The populist campaign was the
first concerted attempt to foment revolution in Russia. Alas, it failed even
more ignominiously than the Decembrists' reckless gamble. The masses
did not know what to make of the populists' clamorous agitation. Rebelling
against the Tsar, the protector of Russian Orthodox Church, seemed to
many blasphemous. No wonder that some populists were turned in to the
police by the very people they swore to liberate. A handful of intellectuals
were executed, many ended up in jails or in Siberian exile, feeding an

image -- popular or sinister depending on one's bias -- of a young
freedom fighter/nihilist sacrificing his life in the struggle for people's
happiness.
Disgusted with such political turpitude and embittered by the secret
police's brutal response to their propaganda, the intelligenty sought to
regroup. Some hot heads gave up on spreading the word altogether and
resorted to propaganda by deed: bombing the royal family, assassinating
state officials, sabotaging official institutions. Dmitri Karakozov's
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander II in 1866 opened up a
new chapter in the intelligentsia's struggle with Russian Tsarism.
However, by the time the splintering populist organization, the "people's
will," managed to track and assassinate Alexander II, the public mood in
Russia swung to the right.
As we saw earlier, intellectual culture in Russia received an impetus from
Peter the Great's crash campaign to Westernize Russian society.
Radicalintelligenty were very well aware of this connection. According to
Chernyshevsky, it is the task for a critically-minded intellectual, artist or
writer "to facilitate in every way possible Peter the Great's cause."
[47] Yet, just as the Westernizers lurched toward socialism and
materialism via left Hegelianism, another faction -- the Slavophiles -unfurled their banners heralding Russia 's cultural superiority and its
unique path among the European nations. Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan
Kireevsky, Fedor Tiutchev, Ivan and Konstantin Aksakov belonged to this
influential group whose members saw the country's past as laden with
religious archetypes bearing good tidings for Russia 's future. What the
Westernizers considered to be signs of backwardness -- week legal state,
abridged personal freedom, rudimentary market, constricted property
relations -- the Slavophiles hailed as the country's traditional strength in
which every Russian should take pride. To the Western preoccupation with
the law, the Slavophiles juxtaposed the Russian concern for the ethically
guided action; the Russian peasants' preference for communal living, they
argued, was loftier than European individualism inspired by arrogant
humanism; the aversion to private property and competition underscored
the Russian peasants' immunity to bourgeois culture. Even the obedience
to the Tsar and his servants' harsh orders revealed the loyalty and
patience of Russia 's long-suffering people. This patriotic exegesis that
envisioned Russian culture as a cut above any Western European model
was vividly rendered in Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace. [48] There
was a message for the intelligentsia in these Slavophile musings: stop
imitating the West, cease leading Russia into the abyss, learn from the
Russian people. As Konstantin Leontiev, a staunch conservative and a

dye-in-the-wool Slavophile put it, "[H]e who understands how vitally
important the cultural, national style is for our state, what a saving grace
it could be for the Slavs to shed the mental yoke of Europe, must wish not
to enhance the intelligentsia's impact on the simple folk, but quite to the
contrary -- he must look for the best and easiest ways to emulate the
muzhik." [49]
The Slavophiles's nationalism was laced with irony, for the 19th century
Russian patriots owed as big a debt of gratitude to European thought as
did Westernizers. Slavophilism was propelled into being by the romantic
reaction to the French revolution as exemplified by Joseph de Maistre (he
lived in Russia for a while and his words and writings enjoyed considerable
influence here) and it was especially indebted to the latter Shelling. This
eminent German philosopher spurned the Enlightenment and rationalism,
elevated the mystical and irrational intuition as the surest way to discern
divine will, and enjoined each Folk to carry out God's commandments in
its own inimitable fashion. Still, it should be stressed that, unlike their
ultra-conservative followers, the original Slavophiles did not deny other
nations their special place in world history and urged their countrymen to
appreciate other people's customs. The point was to find a proper balance
between the national and the world historical:
[T]he advocates of Western Europe tout exclusively the European national
form [narodnost] which they endow with world historical significance and
in the name of which they deprive the Russian people the right to the
universally human [obshchechelovecheskoe]. . . . But who said that the
national view [narodnoe vozzrenie] rules out the universal human view?
Quite to the contrary. We say English literature, French literature, German
literature, Greek literature, and that does not bother us. . . . Why not
grant the same right to the Russians? . . . To deny the Russian people the
right to its own national view is to hold them back from partaking in the
world historical cause. [50]
A great Russian writer, Fedor Dostoyevsky, articulated a similar view in
his famous "Pushkin speech" in which he tried to reconcile the
Westernizers and Slavophiles. The speech was given on June 8, 1880 , in
connection with the dedication of a monument to Pushkin. [51] It belongs
to the venerable Russian tradition, still very much alive, that seeks to
fathom Pushkin's legacy for the present time, i.e., to decipher the
cultural/political message to posterity embedded in Pushkin's literary
corpus. In Dostoyevsky's exegesis, Pushkin went through three stages in
his career: (1) the wandering period, where he acted and wrote as a
typical Russian intellectual seeking to escape oppressive Russian

institutions and find solace in a foreign tradition; (2) the nativist period,
where a mature Pushkin discovered that peace is not to be found outside
the country's borders but in Russian popular culture, in its rich heritage of
fairy tales, cultural masterpieces, and the imperial glory secured for the
nation by Peter the Great and his successors; (3) the synthetic period,
where wise Pushkin summoned his genius to fuse the native tradition with
the cultural riches of other nations. In his talk, Dostoyevsky warned the
intelligentsia ("the Russian wanderers") that it must reclaim its national
roots or risk becoming an albatross around the country's neck. "Humble
yourself, proud man; first and foremost break your pride. Humble
yourself, idle man; first and foremost come and toil on your homeland's
soil." [52] Countering the rising tide of political violence, Dostoyevsky
deployed his celebrated argument against cruel means as inimical to
genuine social reconstruction:
Let's try to imagine that you are erecting a building that in the end would
secure happiness for the entire human race, would guarantee people
peace and security at last. Imagine, also, that for that purpose you have
to torture to death just one human being -- maybe even not a very good
person, the one who might appear down right ridiculous to some. . . .
Would you consent to be an architect in such an undertaking and remain
forever happy . . . if in the foundation of the building there is the suffering
of just one, even if only the pettiest, being ruthlessly and unjustly tortured
to death? [53]
What makes the Russians different and what Pushkin's genius revealed
beyond reasonable doubt, according to Dostoyevsky, was that his
countrymen were endowed with the rare ability to empathize with the pain
and suffering of the entire humanity:
Yes, the calling of the Russian person is undoubtedly all-European and
universal. . . . Oh, European nations -- they do not even know how they
are dear to us! I believe that in the future we, or rather our successors,
future Russian people, will understand to the last person that to be a true
Russian means this: to strive to bring about a final reconciliation of
European contradictions, to alleviate the European angst in our universal
and all-embracing Russian soul, to absorb [vmestit] in it our brethren with
the brotherly love, and ultimately, perhaps to say a final word about the
great universal harmony, the brotherly agreement among all tribes that
live according to Christian evangelic law." [54]
The great novelist's exegesis might have been flawed (as we saw earlier,
Pushkin never completely surrendered his wandering spirit), but

Dostoyevsky rightly sensed a new movement afoot in his land. Indeed,
the public was ready to believe that "all our slavophilism and westernism
is but one great confusion, albeit a necessary one." [55] With the radical
intelligentsia losing its monopoly on high cultural discourse, the
intelligentsia began to split into competing camps. Radical intellectuals
included the old-style populists, anarchists, social democrats, social
revolutionists, and since the early 20th century, the Bolsheviks. The liberal
camp was mostly inhabited by Zemstvo activists who came from local
administrations elected by popular vote from different social strata
following Alexander II's cautious political reforms. Moderate conservatives
with religious interests centered around the "Vekhi" group, whose leading
representatives -- Nikolai Berdiaev, Petr Struve, and Sergei Bulgakov -grew away from Marxism while remaining committed to personal freedom
and parliamentary institutions. There was also the rightist faction,
represented by Pobedonostsev, Leontiev, and their clones, which
championed ultra nationalist causes and encouraged the black hundreds
movement sworn to stamp out foreign influence and eradicate the left.
Any account of this period would be incomplete without mentioning Anton
Chekhov, a famous playwright and short story writer. The sickly,
somewhat reclusive man commanded respect from nearly all intellectual
factions in Russia, even though left- and right-wing intellectuals felt
uneasy about his politically noncommittal stance. Chekhov decried
"partisanship and cliquishness" which dominated the contemporary
cultural scene and which he found inimical to creativity and fairness: "I
fear those who search between my lines in the hope to discover some
tendency and pronounce me a liberal or a conservative. I am not a liberal,
a conservative, a gradualist, a monk, or an indifferentist. . . . My sacred
creed is human body, health, wit, talent, inspiration, love, and absolute
freedom, the freedom from violence and lies whichever form the latter
might take. [56] Chekhov's resentment toward the partisan intelligentsia
nagging him to choose between political camps would show more of an
edge with time. This is what he had to say about left-wing intellectuals a
few years before he died: "I do not believe in our intelligentsia,
mendacious, sanctimonious, hysterical, bad-mannered, lazy -- do not
believe it even when it complains and pines away, for its oppressors come
from its very depth. I believe only in separate individuals, whether they
are intelligenty or muzhiki, for they are a real force, even if a small one."
[57]
The first sentence from this passage has been quoted ad infinitum and
remains as popular among today's critics of Russian intelligentsia as it was
early in the century. Yet, it is apt to be misinterpreted as a blanket

condemnation of all Russian intellectuals. In fact, Chekhov's views were
far more differentiated and complex. His writings are filled with passages
where he praises the intelligentsia's selfless work and forthright attitudes.
[58]More importantly, the commentators tend to overlook that Chekhov's
revolt against the intelligentsia represented a revolutionary turn toward
civic virtues vital to a civilized society the Russian intellectuals professed
to endorse. Poriadochnost and intelligentnost are two terms that, following
Chekhov, the Russians would use to denote the new attitudes that
the intelligenty must cultivate in themselves and display in all life's
circumstances. Both words refer to a person who is trustworthy in his
dealings, respects people regardless of their status, strives to do justice to
an opponent's argument, displays professionalism in his work, and seeks
to practice what he preaches. The intelligenty who embody these social
qualities possess moral intelligence -- a trait by no means confined to
people with educational credentials, white-color workers, artists, etc., but
widely spread throughout the population. Moral intelligence is not a badge
of honor that, once awarded, could be proudly displayed on any occasion:
it is a claim to be redeemed, an ongoing accomplishment, an identity that
is good only until further notice. Raising oneself from the depraved
conditions and becoming a morally intelligent person -- such is an
ideology that Chekhov bequeathed to his countrymen, particularly those
aspiring to join the ranks of the intelligentsia:
What if you write a story about a young man, son of a serf, ex-shopkeeper, a high school and college student, brought up to honor the rank,
to slobber over priests' hands, to jenuflex before other people's thoughts,
who gave thanks for every piece of bread he received, was whipped
repeatedly, walked through wet streets in leaking shoes, engaged in
fights, tormented pets, loved to dine with rich relatives, casually lied to
God and people just because he felt his nothingness -- write how this
young man is squeezing a slave out of himself, drop by drop, and how one
glorious day he wakes up and realizes that not the slave's blood is
coursing through his veins but real human blood. [59]
Chekhov's influence would be felt in many subsequent debates about the
intelligentsia. A new element in these debates was the strong accent
onintelligentnost ("moral intelligence" is the best translation I could think
of here) as a trait distinguishing genuine intelligenty, on the intelligentsia
as an ethical rather than a socio-economic category. Ivanov-Razumnik
highlighted this usage in his widely read history of the Russian
intelligentsia's political activism, where he censured those who "equate
every 'educated' person with the representative of the intelligentsia,
forgetting that no educational certificate can in and of itself turn an

'educated' person into an intelligent." [60] Tugan-Baranovsky meant very
much the same thing when he wrote that "the term 'intelligentsia' is
commonly used here to connote not so much a socio-economic as sociomoral category." [61]
Characteristically, intellectuals with disparate political agendas sought to
appropriate Chekhov's legacy for their cause: those on the right quoted
approvingly his harsh words about the intelligentsia, while those left of
center recited his paeans to civic virtues. We can see this in two influential
volumes that appeared a few years after the revolutionary upheavals of
1905-1907 shattered the Tsarist authorities' confidence and forced them
into political concessions. One was published in 1909 by several religiously
oriented writers under the heading Guideposts. Essays on the Russian
Intelligentsia; the other, The Intelligentsia in Russia, was assembled a
year later by liberals as a response to Guideposts (in Russian -- Vekhi).
The first opus opened up with a frontal attack on the Russian intellectual
tradition. Nikolai Berdiaev used the derogative
term intelligentshchina(rabid intellectualism) to disparage Russian
intellectuals for their "cliquishness," "extreme emotionalism," "political
despotism," and "artificial isolation from national life" -- the qualities that,
according to Berdiaev and his colleagues, incited the bloody confrontations
between workers and the authorities. [62] Petr Struve condemned radical
intellectuals who breathed "arrogance and haughtiness" and showed
"intolerance to dissident." Such intellectuals like to strike "the proud and
offensive pose of a savior," to contrast themselves to "obyvateli" or downto-earth citizens preoccupied with their daily routines; yet, their reckless
agitation and aversion to work through normal political venues
precipitated chaos and bloodshed. [63] The intelligentsia displayed
religious fervor in its political pursuits, but its "asceticism" and "vacuous
heroism" was the obverse of "patient selfless work" [podvizhnichestvo]
expected from a devout Christian, in as much as the bellicose intellectuals
paid only lip service to "the notion of people's equal worthiness, of the
absolute dignity of every human personality." [64]
In a piece titled "The Ethics of Nihilism," Semen Frank endeavored to
show that "The intelligentsia's entire attitude to politics, its fanaticism and
intolerance, its impracticality and ineptitude in political matters, its
obnoxious penchant for factional fighting, its warped sense of the state's
mission -- all this flows from its monastic-religious spirit, from the fact
that its political activities are undertaken not so much to carry out
reforms, objectively useful in a secular sense, but to exterminate the
enemies of faith and to convert by force the infidels into its own faith."

[65] Mikhail Gershenson shed light on the intelligentsia's disturbing
psychological traits underscored by a sharp contrast between the
intelligentsia's moralism in public affairs and unscrupulousness its
members sport in private life. "The intelligentsia's everyday life is, as a
whole, a terrible mess," charged Gershenson; its members show "not a
trace of discipline, no effort to be consistent even in public; days are
wasted God knows how, as the spirit moves you, everything is topsyturvy; idleness, untidiness, homeric unreliability in personal affairs, naive
lack of good faith in work, unbridled tendency toward despotism in
politics, callous indifference to another personality; before the authorities
-- sometimes proud challenge, sometimes meek compliance. . . ." [66]
The Vekhi authors had their own list of exemplary Russian thinkers -Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Fet, Tiutchev -- whom they praised lavishly
for their nonpartisanship, humanistic beliefs, and universal, often
religious, values -- all conspicuously absent in left-wing radicals. To head
off the intelligentsia's dangerous proclivities, the Vekhi writers exhorted its
members to give up its obsession with politics, look deep inside their
hearts, and rediscover the Christian faith from which the spirit of justice
and egalitarianism so dear to socialists had originally sprung. "For all
those who subscribe to this idea, which in my deep conviction, has
religious roots," concluded Struve, "it must be clear that the Russian
intelligentsia needs a radical perestroika of its social-economic worldview.
I think that such a perestroika is already under way" [67]
A year after Vekhi, the Russian liberals brought out a volume summing up
their political creed. Liberal intellectuals concurred with the Vekhi writers
that the left radicals's militancy and partisanship were regrettable,
particularly after the 1905-1907 upheavals and subsequent reforms
opened up the political process, allowing Russian political parties to work
together for socio-economic progress. But the liberals chided the Vekhi
critics because the latter seemed to shun politics and disregard the
historical context that exacerbated the intellectuals' mores. "[O]ne could
not help meeting with disbelief and incredulity this call: be a human being,
have faith, learn to love," inveighed Ivan Petrunkevich, "for the inevitable
answer is: precisely because I treat and feel myself a human being in
solidarity with all other human beings, I find it necessary to foster the
[political] conditions without which human dignity will suffer; precisely
because I love and have faith, everything that concerns my personal life
recedes into the background." [68]
Dmitri Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky noted with satisfaction the movement from
the ideologically rigid ideological platforms to a more tolerant attitude

toward the opponents. "Since the [18]80s, the call toward
'nonpartisanship' [bezpartiinost] was heard among the intelligentsia,
though this nonpartisanship should be understood in an ideological sense - as freedom from the demands of one or another ideology." He paid
homage to Chekhov, whose stance, he insisted, did not mean the
wholesale withdrawal from politics: "Among the people who advanced this
slogan was Chekhov, who was immediately derided as lacking principles.
Now we know that the freedom from powerful ideologies does not mean
the lack of principles and is far from implying intellectual and social
indifferentism. The type of an intelligent without a definite ideology but
with definite principles and a thoughtfully chosen social and political
orientation is currently becoming more and more wide-spread." [69]
Pavel Miliukov, a historian by training and head of the Constitutional
Democratic party, ridiculed the extremists' belief in "panaceas, messianic
doctrines, immediate and decisive role of personal sacrifice." [70] At the
same time, he rejected the religious critics' spurious attempts to drive a
wedge between the rootless intelligentsia and the patriotic folk, since "the
appearance of the intelligentsia is the necessary preliminary condition
before a nation can acquire its own self-consciousness. Self-consciousness
is already a product of the consciousness-raising by the intelligenty."
[71]Miliukov pointed out that overzealous habits were forced upon the
intelligentsia by oppressive political institutions which left few alternatives
to the progressive forces opposed to the autocratic rule. The situation
changed for the better, he went on, since the parliamentary organs began
to be formed in Russia after 1905, and it would continue change in the
future, as the Russian political process was funneled into more normal
channels: "As its influence grows, the sectarian character of [the
intelligentsia's] ideology would weaken, its content diversify, its goals
become more specific, its immediate task grow more concrete, its
business like qualities improve, and its public activity acquires continuity,
organization, and systematicity." [72]
The liberal pragmatism seemed at odds with the the Vekhi writers'
revivalist tone, but the differences between the two should not be
exaggerated. Both groups acknowledged that ideological extremism
disfigures those who give in to it, both emphasized the civilizing effect
that the rule of law has on society, both endorsed reforms carried out
through legitimate political channels and urged intellectuals to cultivate
civility as a condition for civic society. The primary target audience in each
case was the nascent middle class, whose entrance on the political scene
was delayed by the country's autocratic tradition. Moreover, neither
program really implied that the Russian intelligentsia would cease to be a

political force. Contrary to all appearances, the Vekhi authors remained
squarely rooted in the Russian intellectual tradition -- witness their
passion for justice, exalted view of high culture, and commitment to public
discourse as a vehicle for social reconstruction. What they endeavored to
do was to clean up Russian intellectual culture by ridding it of its
ideological intolerance, emotional violence, and heroic grandstanding -the points on which conservatives and liberals saw eye to eye.
Such was the era's original contribution to Russian intellectual culture.
This epoch started with the Slavophiles' attack on the extreme westernism
and Dostoyevsky's critique of the intelligentsia's rootlesness, it witnessed
Chekhov's appeal for civility and nonpartisanship, and it ended in soulsearching by the Vekhi authors and liberal thinkers. Anton Chekhov was
particularly instrumental in exposing the lack of civility among the
intelligentsia, its failure to see the link between bourgeois culture and
democratic institutions. By rejecting meshchanstvo, Russian intellectuals
also rejected the civic virtues undergirding bourgeois democracy: the
respect for law, private property, and the dignity of other people; the
willingness to compromise and work through legitimate political channels;
the cultivation of professionalism and hard work. Chekhov's ambivalent
attitude toward the intelligentsia reflected the intelligentsia's own
ambivalence about middle class values. Late bloomers by world historical
standards, Russian intellectuals could see not only the glories of capitalist
modernity but also its distempers and discontents. The intelligentsia might
have been a modernizing force in Russian history, but it also wished to
prolong the remnants of communitarianism hailing back to Russia 's
premodern past. Hence, the philippics against bourgeois philistinism,
contempt for obyvateli and meshchane, dismal work habits, and the
bohemian unscrupulousness in personal relations. With Chekhov, Vekhi
critics, and liberal intellectuals, Russia began to inch toward psychological
modernity which grounds civic society in civic virtues. After all, lasting
social change must encompass both personality and institutions, whether
you start with oneself or with the political system. Were it not for the
Bolshevik revolution, the liberal program of fostering a middle class
culture and civic society in Russia might have succeeded. Alas, liberal
critics were not able to get their message across. They remained marginal
in the overpoliticized world of Russian cultural politics and soon yielded to
left-wing radicalism.
The Intelligentsia Under the Soviet Rule
One reason the 19th century intelligentsia tried to shoulder such a heavy
load of responsibilities was that it could not find an ally in its strenuous

efforts to bring political modernization to Russia . While in Europe the
intellectual strata grew largely from the bourgeoisie and more or less
faithfully served its needs, the Russian intelligentsia had virtually no ties
to the third estate, which did not come into its own until way into the 19th
century. Before the intelligentsia could liberate any class, therefore, it had
to mold it into a self-conscious political entity. If the Decembrists had any
claim to stake concerning class representation, it had to do with the
gentry's interests. This claim, made in a rather oblique fashion, did have
some historical grounds: the Decembrists were committed to liberating
their estate from autocratic excesses and consolidating the gains the
Russian gentry made during the reign of Catherine II. For all their
republican zeal, however, the Decembrists had no intention of dismantling
serfdom; they were also quite content to leave the monarchy in place.
The emancipation schemes favored by the populists were designed to
benefit "the people" -- the toiling masses oppressed by the Tsarist regime.
But the Russian serfs were too broad, illiterate, and dispersed a social
entity to act as a self-conscious agent of historical change. Liberal
intellectuals appealed primarily to the middle class, which stood to gain
the most from the intended political reforms. The middle class was an
increasingly assertive social stratum at the turn of the century, though its
influence was confined chiefly to cities and provincial centers.
Conservatives wished to preserve the present class structure or, better
still, to go back to some more archaic social forms concocted by the
conservative romantics' vivid imagination.
There was also a small Social Democratic party whose followers embraced
the Marxist doctrine, pinning their hopes on wage labor -- the proletariate.
But their claim to "representing a class" was particularly far-fetched, given
that industrial workers made up barely three percent of the Russian
population at the century's turn. [73] Realizing that nurturing the Russian
proletariat was a long term project, moderate Social Democrats -theMensheviki -- tried to open up their party and turn it into a mainstream
organization with a broad socialist appeal. The party's radical wing,
theBolsheviki, remained committed to the communist dogma that
envisioned the proletariat seizing power and freeing the country from the
parasite classes exploiting wage laborers. A thankless task of raising the
workers' class consciousness fell into the lap of educated party members.
The latter went about their business in much the same way as their
populist predecessors, relying primarily on propaganda and agitation, but
also making a concerted effort to set up a party organization, train
professional revolutionaries, and utilize clandestine publications.

From the start, the Bolsheviks' feelings about the intelligentsia were
drenched with ambivalence. Vladimir Lenin and his followers understood
all too well that an educated elite had to rouse and lead the masses to the
barricades. They also acknowledged their debt to the great tradition of
Russia 's radical democrats. At the same time, the Bolsheviks went out of
their way to distinguish themselves from both populist intellectuals, whose
program they found unsuitable for the industrial age, and liberal thinkers,
whose middle class instincts and preference for discursive means were
unmistakably bourgeois. As Leon Trotsky (a Menshevik who later joined
the Bolshevik faction) noted in his early piece about the intelligentsia,
Russia lacked well organized socio-economic groups, and that compelled
radical intellectuals to act as a "class substitute" and to invest much time
in training progressive classes for their final assault on the autocratic
state. "However great the intelligentsia's role might have been in the
past," Trotsky pointed out, "it will occupy a dependent and subordinate
place in the future." [74] Thus, the Bolsheviks declined to count
themselves among the ranks of the mainstream intelligentsia. They saw
their party as the vanguard of the working class and reserved no special
political role for the intelligentsia in a future socialist society where
intellectuals would simply become a service group distinguished by its
education and occupational status.
While in opposition, the Bolsheviks listed among their political demands
basic civil liberties. They reasserted their commitment to glasnost after
the revolution toppled the Tsarist regime in February 1917, using
newfangled political institutions to buttress their public image as a
radically democratic force. Sometime in the Summer of 1917 state
institutions began to collapse, and on October 26, 1917 , the Bolsheviks
seized power. Almost immediately, they ordered the closure of hostile
publishing outlets, starting with the conservative press, then spread the
ban to liberal newspapers, and eventually disallowed any publications that
refused to bow to the Bolshevik dictate. [75] The October revolution
(critics would call it a "putsch"), dealt a major setback to the hopes for
democratic reform the Russian intelligentsia had nurtured for decades.
Nothing could have done more to unite the faction-ridden Russian
intellectuals, who were willing to tone down their differences in order to
express their collective dismay at such a flagrant attempt to suppress
glasnost. Zinaida Gippius was right when she claimed that the
intelligentsia was "solidly anti-bolshevik at the time" and that "the
exceptions were very few." [76] Virtually all nongovernment newspapers
attacked the Bolsheviks, demanding the restoration of glasnost. The
nation's leading intellectuals wrote personal letters to the Bolshevik

authorities pleading with them to change their misguided course and set
free the citizens arrested on trumped-up ideological charges
(correspondence between the writer Vladimir Korolenko and Anatoly
Lunacharsky, head of the Department of Education, is a fine example of
this genre). Even some intellectuals close to Lenin felt startled by his
reckless grab for power. Maxim Gorky, an important writer and a wellknown public figure with links to the Bolsheviks, waged a losing battle
against the new regime on the pages of his newspaper "New Life." "Lenin,
Trotsky and their cronies have already been poisoned by power," wrote
Gorky on November 7, 1917 ; "witness their shameful attitude toward the
freedom of speech, personality, and the sum total of rights for which
democracy fought for a long time." [77] Rather than mobilizing the
national intellectual resources, charged Gorky , the Bolsheviks declared
war on the intelligentsia. Not only were intellectuals losing their livelihood
and their rights -- they were also terrorized by the armed workers pitted
against the middle classes by the unscrupulous communists. "Something
urgent needs to be done, we have to stop the process that leaves the
intelligentsia physically and spiritually exhausted; it is time to realize that
it is the nation's brain and that it was never more needed than today."
[78]
Needless to say, Gorky 's newspaper was closed. To this tirade, Lenin
answered with a well-known quip about those "pathetic intelligenty, the
lackeys of capitalism who pride themselves on being the nation's brain. In
fact, they are not the brain but shit." [79] This motto summed up the
views on the recalcitrant intelligentsia held by the Bolsheviks during this
period. There were concerted efforts to engage intellectuals with valuable
technical skills (military officers, railroad engineers, doctors, etc.) in
state's sponsored programs, but those with a liberal arts education and/or
hostile worldview were considered to be a drag on the economy and a
dangerous fifth column that must be neutralized before the disgruntled
intellectuals regroup and start fomenting an opposition. After a brief
respite that the communist government gave to the nation in the hope of
restoring its economic health, the Bolsheviks renewed their attack on the
intelligentsia. In the Spring of 1922, Lenin ordered massive arrests among
the Bolsheviks' one time allies, the Mensheviks. Some were deported to
Russia 's Far East , some sent into a permanent exile abroad. The Social
Revolutionists met with the same fate in the Fall of 1922. The world was
startled when in August of 1922 the Bolsheviks put the nation's leading
philosophers on a ship (it would become known as the "philosophical
ship") and sent them into exile in the West, with the promise to shoot
every person who would dare to come back. [80] The newspaper Pravda
printed an article on August 31, 1922 , to mark the occasion, bearing an

eloquent title: "The First Warning." About the same time, Felix
Dzerzhinsky, the feared head of the secret police, dispatched a directive to
his deputy: "Information must be gathered by all departments and
funnelled into the department of intelligentsia. For every intelligent there
must be a file. . . . Also, we must keep an eye on all literature in our
jurisdiction." [81]
To assert strict control over brainworkers, to separate the politically
reliable from the unreliable intellectuals, to instill communist ideology in
the professional cadres, and to raise the new generation of the proletarian
intelligentsia -- such were the key elements in the Communist party policy
in regard to the intelligentsia. [82] "We need the intelligentsia cadres that
are ideologically trained in a certain way," wrote Nikolai Bukharin, a
leading communist intellectual at the time. "Yes, we shall
mold intelligenty, we shall manufacture them as if on the assembly line."
[83] Countering the charge that the Bolsheviks betrayed the
intelligentsia's emancipatory ideals, Lunacharsky wrote that you "cannot
expel Bolshevik- intelligenty from the intelligentsia and cross out the great
role it played in the history of this 'order.'" [84] But he also noted
cynically, "The more lacking in ideas the person is today, the more
valuable he is. That is to say, if a technical specialist [spets], say, some
engineer, has many ideas, it is worse, for these ideas distract a person
from his work. But when he has no ideas, we could let him work right
away. . . ." [85] The Bolsheviks were setting up a social machine where
every cog and spindle was to serve its function, with the intellectuals
doing its job as social technicians under the close supervision of the
Communist party's social engineers.
Not all intellectuals immediately rejected the Bolshevik takeover. Some
felt that the new regime deserved a chance, that it had to act swiftly to
fend off the reactionaries, that civil rights would be restored once the
emergency situation eases up. As usual, Russian writers lead the way.
Vladimir Mayakovsky, Alexander Block, Valery Briusov, Sergei Esenin,
Nikolai Kliuev, Boris Pilniak, Isaak Babel and several other prominent
literary figures threw their lot with the Bolsheviks. Poet Briusov became a
censor. Mayakovsky prided himself on dedicating his muse to the
proletarian cause. Esenin and Kliuev hailed the revolutionary whirlwind
that stirred the hitherto inert peasant masses into political action.
[86] Pilniak and Babel wrote novels glorifying the Soviet power's early
years. Particularly intriguing was the case of Alexander Block, Russia 's
premier symbolist poet. Block greeted the October revolution with an
article titled "Can the Intelligentsia Work with the Bolsheviks?" His
answer: "It can and it ought to [for] the intelligentsia hears the same

music as the Bolsheviks. The intelligentsia has always been revolutionary.
The Bolshevik decrees are the symbols of the intelligentsia. [The latter's]
bitter feelings about the Bolsheviks are a surface phenomenon, and they
are beginning to pass away." [87]
Block's clumsy attempt to justify the October revolt by invoking poetic
symbols of "chaos," "storm," and "rebellion" supposedly shared by the
revolutionaries and creative intelligentsia provoked a fierce rebuttal from
the old school thinkers who accused him of kowtowing to the Bolsheviks,
thumbing his nose at the rule of law, and betraying innocent victims
sacrificed to the revolutionary cause. Ilya Erenburg reminded Block in his
article "The Intelligentsia and Revolution" that violent means compromise
sound ends and that the lofty slogans deployed by the Bolsheviks could be
just a cover-up for their ruthless drive to power. Every time I hear slogans
like "peace" and "brotherhood," intimated Erenburg, I could not help
wondering if "they are about to start shooting," "if I am going to be
killed." [88]
Block penned a few more articles on revolution and the intelligentsia and
gathered them in a separate volume bearing the same title, but his
enthusiasm for the new regime ebbed as the Bolsheviks stepped up the
arrests and expulsions of intellectuals. In his last public speech, he
suddenly changed his tune and reverted to time-honored Russian
symbols. The occasion could not have been more portentous -- the literary
gathering commemorating Pushkin's death. Block quoted Pushkin
extensively, citing the famous lines from the 1836 verse where the poet
intimates his subversive wish "for no livery/to bend my neck, my
conscience, my beliefs." Also recited were Pushkin's paeans to "a secret
freedom" that would take a new meaning for several generations of
intellectuals forced to live under the Soviet rule:
Love and a secret freedom were my beacon,
They taught the heart its simple tune,
To all chicanery my voice was immune,
As people's judgment it steadfastly echoed. [89]
Block ended his speech with a thinly veiled warning to the powers never to
meddle with the poet's secret freedom. "Let bureaucrats face scorn if they
wish to guide poetry into some authorized channels, if they violate its
secret freedom and try to mess up with its mystic destiny." [90] Soon
afterwards, Block's health took a turn to the worse. He applied for an exist
visa to go abroad for medical treatment, but it was denied. After
prominent Bolsheviks pleaded his case before the authorities, the

Politburo, the Communist party's ruling organ, reversed its earlier
decision, but it was too late. Wilting away in matters of months (doctors
were never sure what ailed him), he died at the age of 41, a few days
before the state finally issued him an exit visa. The prophetic words he
voiced in his last public speech served as a poet's own epitaph: "It wasn't
the bullet of Dantes that killed Pushkin. He died because there was no
more air to breath." [91]
Block's fate was not unique among the intellectuals who frowned at the
liberal government brought to power in February of 1917 and sided with
the Bolsheviks after they took over the reins, either out of conviction or
just to see a steadier hand at the helm. Esenin and Mayakovsky
committed suicide. Kliuev, Pilniak, and Babel died in Stalin's concentration
camps along with countless communist sympathizers and fellow travellers.
Even the Communist party intellectuals who pledged to weed out the
bourgeois intelligentsia and replace it with proletarian seedlings
discovered that they were not immune to the anti-intellectualist forces
they had set in motion. Bukharin, Radek, Piatakov, Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Rykov, Rakovsky and many others who belonged to the Bolshevik
braintrust perished in Stalin's purges. Lunacharsky died from natural
causes, but only because he did not live long enough to see the mass
purges. Thanks to his expulsion from the country, Trotsky managed to
survive longer: he was murdered on Stalin's order in Mexico , in 1940.
The purges came in waves, decimating all classes in Soviet society, but
the hardest hit, in relative terms, was the intelligentsia.
Not held in high esteem by Lenin and his comrades, Joseph Stalin went to
unimaginable lengths to settle scores with everybody who had ever had
the misfortune to doubt his intellect and moral intelligence. In the mid30s, he unleashed an unprecedented campaign against the party brass,
setting cadres with working class backgrounds against old time party
theoreticians. [92] By far the most sensational public trial staged by
Stalin's henchmen was directed against the so-called Rightists-Trotskytes
Block, featuring as a star defendant Nikolai Bukharin, once designated by
Lenin as the party's leading intellectual. As you read the ridiculous charges
levelled against the defendants, hear the obsequious praise they heaped
on Stalin, and recoil at the way they abased themselves hoping to save
their own and their relatives' lives, you realize that the absence of
glasnost is not the worst thing an intellectual could face. Although
Bukharin found courage to deny some of the charges brought against him,
he confessed to monstrous crimes he had never committed:
I admit that I am guilty of treason to the Socialist fatherland, the most

heinous of possible crimes, of the organization of kulak uprisings, of
preparations for terrorist acts and of belonging to an underground, antiSoviet organization. . . . The severest sentence would be justified,
because a man deserves to be shot ten times over for such crimes. . . . I
am kneeling before the country, before the Party, before the whole
people. The monstrousness of my crimes is immeasurable especially in the
new stage of the struggle of the U.S.S.R. [93]
This was the last public statement Bukharin would ever make. He knew
that his life was about to end. Yet, he was praising his mortal enemy ("in
reality the whole country stands behind Stalin; he is the hope of the
world; he is a creator" [94] ), just because there was still a glimmer of
hope -- not to save himself but to save his loved ones held hostage by
Stalin. Golos, glas, glasnost -- the root morpheme is always voice, an
ability to utter, make sense, express oneself. It is this God's gift that
Lenin and Stalin took away from their people. Worse than that, Stalin
made them say things they did not mean, things they found repugnant.
The voicelessness enforced by the autocratic Tsars seemed like a bliss
compared to the perverse glasnost of the Stalin's reign:
People gifted with a voice faced the worst possible torture: their tongue
was ripped out and with the bloody stump they had to praise their master.
The desire to live was irrepressible, and it coerced people into this form of
self-annihilation, just to extend one's physiological existence. The
survivors turned out to be as dead as those who actually died. [95]
These words belong to Nadezhda Mandelstam, the widow of Osip
Mandelstam, arguably the greatest 20th century Russian poet, who
perished in Stalin's concentration camps. Nadezhda Mandelstam's
memoirs are among the most rivetting accounts documenting the
intelligentsia's subterraneous existence in this macabre age. She wrote
about the Russian intelligentsia who was brought up to revere the spoken
word, who saw major strides made toward free expression, and whose
members woke up one day in a different country, where the free word
became a capital offence. While some intellectuals publicly attacked the
revolutionary decrees curtailing glasnost, other chose to lay low in the
hopes that the Bolshevik rule would not last. In the end, they all were
condemned for their negative attitudes which earned the intelligentsia the
reputation as a reactionary force in the eyes of the new authorities. And
since the state quickly asserted its monopoly over employment,
intellectuals had little choice but to cooperate with the regime.
"Is there anybody among us," wrote Zinaida Gippius, another survivor

from this era, "the most farsighted and incorruptible person imaginable,
who is not haunted by the memories of the compromises we were forced
to make in the St. Petersburg's captivity, who did not plead with Gorky for
something or other or ate stale bread from the enemies palms? I know the
taste of such bread, of this damn ration, as well as the feel of Soviet
money in my hands. . . ." [96] The Soviet government had no intention to
make the intellectual's ideological capitulation easy. It did not spare
efforts to intimidate the intellectuals, to show them who was the boss,
drumming into their heads the conditions of surrender for which they
would be rewarded according to the sincerity of their remorse and the
willingness to inform on their brethren still persisting in their obstinate
ways. Most chose to compromise not out of conviction but out of
necessity, citing the survival instinct, the need to protect children.
"Theoretically, I know that one should not compromise, but how could I
urge somebody to throw caution to the wind and not to compromise, to
forget about your children. To all my friends I counsel -- compromise,"
wrote Nadezhda Mandelshtam. "There is one more thing I can add: do not
bring children into this monstrous world." [97]
Writers and artists found it particularly hard to silence the voice of their
conscience. "I do not harbor hatred to anybody -- that is my 'precise
ideology,'" wrote Mikhail Zoshchenko in 1921. [98] These words would be
dredged up twenty five years later by Yury Zhdanov, a party hack in
charge of Soviet art and ideology, who publicly humiliated the writer for
his conciliatory stance and counterrevolutionary sentiments. When Yuri
Olesha talked about the psychological difficulties that intellectuals faced
adjusting to the new regime, he became a synonym of "gnilaia [rotten]
intelligentsia" and subjected to endless derisions as an ideologically
unstable element (Ilf and Petrov's fictional intelligent Vasisualy Lokhankin
had some traits reminiscent of Olesha). "I seize my own self, reach out to
strangle that part of myself which suddenly balks and stirs its way back to
the old days," wrote Olesha; "I wish to stifle that second 'self,' and the
third self, and every 'self' which come to haunt me from the past."
[99] Vladimir Mayakovsky described his arduous labor of fitting an old self
into the procrustean bed of Soviet ideology as "Stepping on your own
song's throat." His own labor continued until the moment when he finally
sent a bullet through his head. Something broke inside him, some
wayward self escaped from the dungeon, an old song he was trying to
strangle burst out and momentarily deafened his ideological sensibilities.
Maxim Gorky did not have to do his penance in public, for he was too
much revered by the Bolsheviks as the first proletarian writer, but when
he yielded to the tempting invitations and returned to Russia from his
exile in Italy , he found himself increasingly isolated, mistrusted, and

ignored. Soon after his son was murdered by the NKVD, Gorky died under
mysterious circumstances. But not before he paid his tribute to the glories
of the Stalinist system as the founder of the "socialist realism" in literature
and the chief "engineer of human souls."
The Bolsheviks stopped exiling their enemies abroad in the early 20s,
though a handful found their way to the West in the mid-20s. About the
same time, the officially sponsored trips abroad by Soviet citizens were
drastically curtailed (Mayakovsky committed suicide soon after he lost his
travelling privileges when the authorities began to suspect his loyalty).
Those who missed the last train or did not wish to taste the stale bread of
emigration, were forced to collaborate with the regime. As time wore on,
everyone felt the psychological pressure to reconcile one's actions loyal to
the regime with heartfelt beliefs. Some time in the early 30s, poet Boris
Pasternak acknowledged that the Soviet power was well entrenched, that
the Russian people seemed to have sided with the communists, and that it
was time for writers to accept the inevitable. [100] Osip Mandelshtam,
who worked for various Soviet publications, called himself "a Bolshevik
without a party card." [101] Mikhail Bulgakov assured the NKVD, a KGB
precursor, that he considered the Soviet regime "extremely stable," that
he "sunk strong roots in Soviet Russia," and that he could "not imagine
himself as a writer outside" his homeland. [102] Marina Zvetaeva, who
returned to the Soviet Union after 17 years in emigration, had to swear
her political correctness and the loyalty of her husband arrested by the
NKVD soon after his return ("[My husband] served his homeland and the
communist idea with his soul and body, word and deed.") [103] Anna
Akhmatova, whose husband, poet Nikolai Gumilev, was executed by the
Bolsheviks and her son languished in the Gulag, had to repent in public
after being vilified for writing apolitical, decadent verses. Mikhail
Zoshchenko contributed to Lenin's hagiography with his stories and visited
the infamous Baltic-White Sea channel project where political prisoners
were used as slave laborers. Yuri Olesha penned essays about the happy
family of Soviet people and took part in the campaign against the
composer Dmitri Shostakovich. And these were the best and the brightest,
individuals whose personal courage, indomitable spirit, and creative
accomplishments would be an inspiration for generations to come.
To be sure, the above mentioned artists and intellectuals did their
penance under duress, trying to protect themselves and save their
relatives' lives. Their loyalty oaths are to be taken with a bucket of salt.
But it would be a mistake to dismiss their conversion experiences as
nothing else but protective mimicry, strategically deployed by hunted
intellectuals. "Mandelstam," wrote his widow, "always tried to make up his

mind freely and check his actions against reality, but even he was not an
entirely free person: the noise of time, the noise of life conspired to
suppress his inner voice: 'how could I be right if everybody thinks
otherwise'." [104] The cognitive dissonance between one's actions and
one's beliefs, exacerbated by the enforced unanimity, goaded everyone to
accept what then appeared to be an objective judgment of history.
We should also resist the temptation of erecting too sharp a divide
between the innocent intelligentsia bludgeoned into collaboration with the
regime and the latter's faithful servants. There were many communists,
state officials, and lowly bureaucrats who never completely surrendered
their "secret freedom" and felt perturbed by Stalin's atrocities. We find
numerous, often grudging, references in the memoirs from this era that
hint at a helping hand that this or that Soviet officials offered beleaguered
intellectuals in times of trouble. It could be none other than Anatoly
Lunacharsky, head of the Enlightenment Ministry supervising the
communist education and propaganda, who bombarded the Politburo with
letters demanding an exit visa for Block and helped dozens of intellectuals
to leave Russia when its was still possible. Or it could be a lowly Soviet
clerk arranging a ration card for a hungry writer and declining to report
his angry mutterings to the secret police. "These were people who did
quite well "up there" but who did not forget their old friends. Some of 'us'
are still alive thanks to their efforts." [105
Sorting out victims and predators inhabiting the Soviet zoo is not an easy
task. "As very many people, and especially intelligenty, and especially
artists, and especially writers, Yuri Olesha was this era's victim and its
gardener, its prisoner and its mason." [106] Whether they were on good
terms with the regime or languished on its margins, intellectuals lead a
double or triple existence, thinking one thing to themselves, sounding
another within an earshot of family and friends, and saying and doing
something else in public. This multi-layered existence left a profound mark
on the Soviet intellectual's psyche. He could pride himself on his "secret
freedom," but he also knew that he was compromising with his
conscience. The pattern familiar to us from the time of Pushkin and
Chaadaev blossomed in the Soviet Union where doublespeak and
doublethink were perfected into an art form. Just consider Mandelstam's
1934 verse bitterly renouncing Stalin and his 1937 poem where he sings
praise to the tyrant. Bulgakov's novel "Master and Margarita" satirized
Soviet society, but the same author wrote a play "Batum" extolling Stalin's
virtues. Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago" could not erase his verses about the
nation builder, Joseph Stalin. Anna Akhmatova, a proud spirit steadfastly
squelching every temptation to collaborate with the regime, wrote a poem

glorifying Soviet Russia's spectacular accomplishments. Most of these
writings are unexemplary and better left unread (though Mandelshtam's
1937 Ode to Stalin is a work of rare poetic power!). [107] Some of them
were written under duress (Akhmatova hoped to buy with her verses
amnesty for her son). But all the writings testified to the torturous
existence lead by the Soviet intellectual burdened with conscience and
memory.
Even in this eerie age there were certain standards of morality accepted
within the intelligentsia circles. When Stalin called Pasternak and
questioned him about Mandelshtam who was recently arrested by the
NKVD for his anti-Stalinist verse ("Why didn't you plead for your friend?,"
Stalin asked Pasternak. "If my poet friend were in trouble, I would have
climbed the wall to save him"), [108] Pasternak answered that he did
complain about Mandelstam's arrest and that his friend should be
released. No, he did not confront the tyrant; he did not tell him what a
disgrace to humanity he was or put him on notice that there was a special
place reserved for him in Dante's ninth circle of hell. But Anna Akhmatova
and Nadezhda Mandelshtam were exactly right when they concluded in
their post mortem to this conversation that, under the circumstances,
Pasternak's behavior "merits a solid 'B' grade." Agonizing about one's
actions in morally charged situations, evaluating and reevaluating an
individual's conduct under trying circumstances, would become a sad
pastime for Soviet intellectuals.
Saltykov-Shchedrin, the famous 19th century satirist, formulated a
classical question facing Russian intelligentsia -- What is to be done when
there is nothing you can do? As Soviet experience showed, there were
things intellectuals could do to salvage their battered conscience. This is
the advice Arkady Belinkov had to offer in his book about Yuri Olesha, a
brilliant study indispensable for understanding the psychology of Soviet
intelligentsia: "The worst thing that an intellectual could do [while working
for the system], is to strive to do his base duty with distinction, better
than others, to become the first student." [109] In other words, one had
to do as little damage to others as possible, take only such onerous
assignment that could not be evaded, and do private penance among
friends for one's less than commendable deeds. Mikhail Svetlov joked: An
honest person is the one who never does anything dishonest, except when
he is forced to, and who is disgusted with himself every time he does a
dishonest thing.
Irony, sarcasm, black humor, anecdotes parodying official symbols would
become an indispensable weapon in the arsenal of the Soviet intelligentsia

struggling with inane Soviet realities. We can see them as a sociopsychological hygiene practiced by people seeking to protect their faces
underneath the repugnant masks they wore in public. Irony is a clue, to
himself as well as to others, that what seems to be going on is only a
front not to be confused with a private self hidden beneath the official
uniform. Ironic detachment is worn like a merit badge (or a stigma
depending on how you look at it) that the individual uses to highlight his
difference, to let an alternative spiritual reality peak through the debased
ideological discourse. We have seen how this behavioral gambit was used
by 19th century intellectuals to a rather mixed effect. The same technique
would be used, though more as a prophylactic or survival strategy, by the
Soviet intelligentsia.
Nadezhda Mandelshtam remembers the encounters she had in the early
20s with Ilya Erenburg when "he looked on everything as if he were a
stranger . . . and hid himself behind ironic omniscience. He already figured
out that irony was the weapon of the helpless." [110] We can find brilliant
examples of irony and satire in Shklovsky's book "The Zoo," in Mikhail
Bulgakov novel "Master and Margarita," in Mandelshtam's "The Forth
Prose." Or in this passage from Arkady Belinkov in which he lampoons the
Soviet reluctance to admit that there might be problems in this most
perfect of the possible worlds:
Even in our days, though extremely rarely and only in extraordinary
situations sometimes arise minor contradictions between bad artists and
wonderful society. To be sure, they are resolved expeditiously, but to
ignore them altogether would be a touch premature. Those minor and
instantly resolvable contradictions usually arise in connection with the
slight incongruity between socialist realism and realistic socialism. [111]
Such overextended official rhetorics and symbols would be immediately
recognized by any Soviet intellectual as an irreverent gesture toward
official Soviet ideology. But an experienced censor would also have no
trouble smelling a ruse, which is why none of the just mentioned books
could be published in Stalin's Russia . Written in secret and kept away
from outsiders, sometimes even from family and friends, such works
should be seen as surviving monuments to "secret freedom," Pushkin's
and now the Soviet intellectual's last solace. As for irony, this ultimate
weapon of the spiritual proletariat, it was directed mostly at the relatives,
colleagues, and friends who bore the brunt of bitterness and alienation
that the creative spirits suffered in the land of perverted glasnost.
Memoirs from this period tell us about the price intellectuals paid for their
survival, about their collective "traumatic psychosis," as Nadezhda

Mandelstam called the phenomenon, though we are already familiar with
it under the name "terrible ulcer" that Chaadaev gave to it back in the
19th century. Subsumed under these terms are abnormalities encysted in
a psyche that suffered intellectual abuse first hand or witnessed the
ideological bloodbath from afar. A silent witness, points out Igor Kon, a
sociologist who survived Stalinism, was worse off in some ways,
particularly if he was young. [112] Helplessness and terror experienced by
the children whose parents were declared to be "enemies of the people"
induced a trauma they would not be able to shake for life. This grim
legacy of political purges will remain with the Russian intelligentsia for
some time to come.
The Stalinist era made few original contributions to Russian intellectual
culture that were not already in place during the Tsars. Perverted glasnost
was one, fear of taking an unpopular stance and going against the
majority was another, plus a compulsive jocularity that masked the
victim's pain. On the whole, the Stalinist only era exacerbated certain trait
in Russian intellectuals culture. It gave them a grotesque, offensive form
which left permanent scars on human beings thrust into the vortex of
Russian history and forced to wade through hostile intellectual currents.
Its legacy was apparent in the ever-widening gap between word and deed,
in the perverted glasnost imposed on the population by the NKVD
inquisitors, in the spiritual withdrawal by intellectuals labelled "inner
emigration," in the off-putting interpersonal style aimed at debunking
official realities through exaggerated irony and sarcasm, and the resultant
pattern of self-loathing revealed by intellectuals alienated from society,
from each other, and from their public selves. The Stalinist social
technologies stifled personal voice, drove private feelings inside, installed
false-consciousness in place of freely chosen convictions, and replaced the
curative powers of dialogue with the numbing force of propaganda. It
would take decades for Russian intellectual culture to free itself from the
Stalinist legacy. This process is far from being complete; in fact, it has
barely begun; but it is going on, thanks to the ideological thaw that Russia
experienced after Stalin's death.
The Intelligentsia and the Thaw
The first step toward sheering Russian intellectual discourse of its Stalinist
diction was made not by an intellectual but by the uncouth, boorish Nikita
Khrushchev, Stalin's protege and the survivor in the on-going Kremlin's
struggle for power. The intelligentsia did not have a monopoly on suffering
in Stalin's Russia . All social strata were equally affected, including the
privileged party nomenklatura. Khrushchev had his reasons to hate Stalin;

he never forgot how "the greatest leader of all time" humiliated him by
ordering this poorly coordinated man to dance Ukrainian folk dances
before his laughing comrades, though that was a trifle compared to what
Stalin did to his flunkies. More to the point, the political purges that
affected many of Khrushchev's friends were about to consume him as
well. Whether or not Stalin was poisoned by his comrades fearing for their
lives, as some researchers suspect, is debatable; there could be no doubt
that toward the end of his life, Stalin was a menace to every sane person
in the land.
In 1956, Khrushchev gave a speech at the 20th Party Congress in which
he denounced Stalin and his terrorist tactics. The speech was secret, the
speaker was mainly preoccupied with the plight of innocent communists
devoured by the Gulag, but its effect was felt by the entire country. In
1961, at the 22d Party Congress, Khrushchev reaffirmed his commitment
to the rule of law, democratic procedures within the party, greater
freedom for artists, and improving welfare of the population as a whole.
"Society [that] shoved the flute down the artist's throat," [113] seemed
ready to recoil from past horrors and grant its members greater leeway.
Khrushchev might not have realized what he set in motion, but the seeds
of glasnost he planted survived his reign, sprouted in underground
intellectual bunkers, and in time, sapped the communist regime's vitality
to a point when it was ready to collapse.
"It is amazing how I survived through those harrowing years," wrote Boris
Pasternak soon after Stalin's death. "It is simply unbelievable what I
allowed myself back then. But then my fate shaped me exactly the way I
shaped my fate. I foresaw a lot and, what is most important, I could not
accept a lot of things . . . I did not store enough patience [for the ordeal].
. . . My time is still far away." [114] Pasternak was right: his time would
come nearly thirty years after his death. Meanwhile, he had to face the
expulsion from the Soviet Writers' Union, renounce his Nobel Price
awarded to him for his novel "Doctor Zhivago," endure heart attacks
precipitated by his daring decision to make his lonely voice heard. Still,
the portentous fact was that Pasternak found courage not only to write a
novel defying the socialist realism's cannons but also to publish it abroad - something that could not have happened without Khrushchev's thaw.
The vials of tears shed by those lucky enough to survive Stalin's regime
nourished the new intellectual currents and helped reestablish the link
between the old and the new intelligentsia.
Ever since the Bolshevik takeover, a debate was raging inside and outside
Russia as to whether the old Russian intelligentsia was dead and whether

it could be brought back to life. According to Georgy Fedotov, one of the
most perceptive historians to study the subject, "The intelligentsia that
was decimated by the revolution has lost its meaning and could not be
resuscitated." [115] Other writers disagreed, arguing that the old Russian
intelligentsia might be dead but the new one, bearing a strong family
resemblance to the prototype, will no doubt emerge. Fedotov himself was
ambivalent in this regard; at the end of his career he called for a new
"intellectual elite" that could rejuvenate Russia. [116] I leave aside the
question of whether the intellectuals who called themselves intelligenty in
post-Stalin Russia are related to the old intelligentsia. What is important is
that these intellectuals took pride in calling themselves by this word
commonly used as a term of derision in Stalin's time, that they were
eager to trace their lineage to their illustrious predecessors and continue
their emancipatory work. I cannot do any justice here to the diverse
intellectual currents that sprung to life in this heady era, but I will try,
using a wide brush, to paint the major ideological divides along which
intellectuals arranged themselves during Khrushchev's thaw and beyond.
There were a great many intellectuals awakened by the de-Stalinization
campaign who realized that the Soviet regime was an aberration. What
they could not agree upon was whether socialism was the culprit or just
its Stalinist incarnation. Most liberal intellectuals who chose to collaborate
with the regime tried to humanize it through painstaking education
designed to expose Stalinist excesses and turn the country toward
democratic socialism. Andrey Sakharov, Russia's leading dissident, spoke
in his path-breaking book that set him on the collision course with the
authorities about "the moral attractiveness of the ideas of socialism and
the glorification of labor, compared with the egotistical ideas of private
ownership and the glorification of capital," leaving no doubt where his own
heart was. [117] Vladimir Lakshin, a widely read Soviet critic, described in
very similar terms the ideals that animated him and his colleagues at
Novy Mir, a premier literary magazine in post-Stalin Russia : "But we
believed in socialism as a noble ideal of justice, we believed in a socialism
that was human through and through and not just with a human face. We
regarded the democratic rights of the individual as incontestable." [118]
The key element in the program advanced by Sakharov and his liberal
followers was glasnost and intellectual freedom, i.e., the need to bring to
the open forum all political issues and the right to voice one's opinion
regarding any policy matter. From the start, the intelligentsia set out to
work within the legal bounds, since Khrushchev's reforms contained an
implicit promise that one could criticize past mistakes and offer fresh ideas
for the future. "The Democratic movement," asserted Andrey Amalrik,

"intends to operate under the rule of law and glasnost and to work for
glasnost, which distinguishes it from small and big underground groups."
[119] " Glasnost, honest and unabridged glasnost," insisted Solzhenitsyn,
"such is the first condition of every healthy society, including ours.
Whosoever does not want glasnost for our society -- is indifferent to his
homeland and thinks only about himself. Those who do not wish glasnost
in our society do not want to cure its ills but to drive them deeper inside
where they could fester." [120]
In 1962, Novy Mir published Solzhenitsyn's powerful novel "One Day in
the Life of Ivan Denisovitch" in which the author, drawing on his own
experience in the Gulag, wrote about a political prisoner's daily routine.
Khrushchev personally approved the publication and rumors swirled about
the Lenin Prize waiting for the author. But the prize went to somebody
else, Khrushchev was deposed, and Leonid Brezhnev's conservative
regime came to power, dashing hopes for further liberalization. This is
when the ideological scales began to fall off from the intelligentsia's eyes
and the Democratic movement went underground. At this very point, a rift
had surfaced within the ranks of the intelligentsia, one that is still
apparent today, which separated intellectuals who chose to continue
working for liberalization through official channels and those who gave up
on reforming the system from within.
Among those who took the second route were Andrey Amalrik, Valery
Chalidze, Alexander Volpin, Petr Grigorenko, Vladimir Bukovsky, Vladimir
Maximov, Natalia Gorbanevskaia, Viktor Nekrasov, and a few dozen other
activists. Their program centered around human rights and the need to
hold the Soviet government accountable for its deeds. The idea, that is
sometimes attributed to Alexander Volpin, seemed simple and
unimpeachable: the government must respect its own laws, as well as the
international covenants it has signed. The point was to spotlight the cases
where the state validated legal procedures and to bring the weight of
public opinion to bear on the culprits: "We do not have to obey anything
but the law. We must defend our laws from the abuse by the authorities.
We are on the side of the law. They are against it." [121] Demonstrations
ensued; signed petitions went to the top; courts where political dissidents
went on trial were picketed by the Democratic movement activists who
demanded glasnost in court rooms guaranteed by the Soviet law. As a
result, public attention was drawn to the fact that local Soviet authorities
routinely used extra-legal means against independent trade union
activists, harassed religious worshipers, curtailed political prisoners' rights,
violated the UN resolutions guaranteeing freedom of speech, political
gatherings, and emigration. The world was not amused to learn that UN

Human Rights Charter signed by the Soviet Union was not released to its
citizens.
Compelling as the idea behind it was, the Democratic movement petered
out after several years of fruitful work that exposed to the world
numerous abuses by the Soviet authorities. The movement's activists
vastly underestimated the government's resolve to stamp out political
dissent, the ruthlessness with which the KGB would clamp down on the
intelligentsia. Soon after Nikita Khrushchev was deposed, the new regime
put the liberals on notice that it would not tolerate open dissent. The
future's chilling auguries came through loud and clear in early 1966 when
the authorities staged the first political show trial in the post-Stalinist era,
sending to prison Andrey Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel for publishing their
works in the West without state approval. More trials followed. Some
activists from the Democratic movement were imprisoned, others sent
into internal exile, still others forced to emigrate.
Along side the Democratic movement, other intellectual currents were
gathering momentum that advocated ethnic minorities' rights, religious
freedom, artistic freedom, the freedom of emigration, and so on. Of
particular note among these groups was the movement initiated by
Alexander Solzhenitsyn and his close friend Igor Shefarevich. Both writers
sought to revive the nationalist themes that lay fallow since the
Slavophiles introduced them into public discourse, giving a special
emphasis to "the traditional ancient Russian notion of pravda [truth] as an
expression of justice that is superior to any formal law."
[122] Solzhenitsyn took issue with Sakharov's notion that intellectual
freedom and human rights were key to social reconstruction in Russia:
Look farther ahead, look at the West. Surely, the West is awash in all
sorts of freedoms, including intellectual freedom. Did it save it? Today we
can see the West: its will paralyzed, sinking fast, oblivious of the future,
its soul neurotic and enfeebled. In and of itself, intellectual freedom can
not save us. . . . The absolutely necessary task [facing us] cannot be
reduced to the political liberation, but to the liberation of our souls from
the participation in the lies imposed on us. . . [123]
Borrowing from the Vekhi platform, Solzhenitsyn decried the Democratic
movement's preoccupation with politics and scolded Russian intellectuals
for neglecting their national roots. The Russian intelligentsia would have to
reinvent itself, he insisted; it has to be reconstituted around "a morally
intelligent core [intelligentnoe iadro]" that is distinguished not by its
members' "scientific degrees, the number of publications, years of

schooling . . . but by the purity of their strivings, by the willingness to
make a spiritual sacrifice -- for truth and most of all -- for this country
where one lives." [124] Solzhenitsyn called the Russians to "national
repentance" and urged his fellow citizens not to cooperate with the regime
or, to use his memorable line, "not to live by lie."
One more important intellectual spring broke through the infertile Soviet
ground in the post-Stalinist era. It was championed by the creative
intelligentsia, mostly writers, like Andrey Siniavsky, Yuly Daniel, and
Joseph Brodsky, who were fed up with politics, shunned official society,
and pursued free aesthetic expression. Those who shared this creed had
as exalted a view of the artist's place in society as did their 19th century
radical predecessors, but they did not want to see art and literature as
playgrounds for conflicting ideologies. Whatever literature had to teach
society should not be done through moralizing and didacticism. Here is
how Joseph Brodsky framed the idea:
Books became the first and only reality, whereas reality itself was
regarded as either nonsense or nuisance. Compared to others, we were
ostensibly flunking or faking our lives. But come to think of it, existence
which ignores the standards professed in literature is inferior and
unworthy of effect. So we thought, and I think we were right. [125]
"The intuitive preference was to read rather than to act," Brodsky went
on, "No wonder our lives were more or less in shambles." But with certain
qualifications, the same could have been said about any person striving to
be morally intelligent under the increasingly oppressive conditions in
Russia. By the mid-70s, the Soviet government opened up a frontal attack
on dissent of all stripes, confronting the Russian intelligentsia with the
familiar conundrum -- what is to be done when there is nothing you can
do. Decent choices were few: to withdraw from society and become an
internal emigre, to go underground and keep exposing Soviet power
abuses, to work through legal channels, doing what one possibly could to
educate society, especially the new generation. Dissident intellectuals who
tried to keep the government's feet to the fire by exposing the KGB
abuses in the West resented their liberal colleagues still working for the
state. The smoldering debate about the morality of collaboration with the
communist government bent on preserving its power at any cost revealed
the deepening rift between radical and liberal intellectuals. The defiant
Solzhenitsyn broke with his liberal colleagues at Novy Mir over its cautious
editorial policies and challenged every Russian citizen to "fortify oneself
and refuse to budge, sacrificing one's life rather than the principle!"
[126] Solzhenitsyn set an example himself by publishing his works abroad

and openly meeting with Western reporters. As Boris Pasternak before
him, Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Writers' Union , but unlike his
predecessor, Solzhenitsyn was deported from Russia , after which he lived
as a political exile in the US . The same fate befell Arkady Belinkov who,
having reached the safety of exile, launched a scathing attack on his
liberal colleagues:
[I]n the concrete history of the 1960s, K. Fedin is worse than N.
Gribachev, P. Antokolsky is more dangerous than V. Kochetov, E.
Evtushenko is more repugnant than A. Markov, B. Slutsky is uglier than V.
Firsov, P. Nilin is more base than I. Shevtsov, I. Selvinsky is more sinister
than A. Sofronov, V. Shklovsky is more distasteful than V. Ermilov
because all these carbonari, Jacobins, freedom fighters, breaknecks do to
[free] public thought what ultramasons, Vendeans, cossacks, and black
hundreds did, except that the former crowd does its thing with panache
and flare, with a sense of poetry, harmony, and charm. . . . [127]
Understandably, the loyal liberals who came into their own in the 60s
(they are still commonly referred to in the intelligentsia parlance
asshestidesiatniki -- the generation of the 60s) had a very different idea
about their mission in society. Efim Etkind, a scholar and a literary critic,
confronted head-on the dilemma that Solzhenitsyn presented to his
countrymen, "Aren't the absolute refusal to compromise and the
unconditional determination to pursue truth and defend human rights
always preferable to the willingness to play politics, make compromises,
and show moral flexibility?" [128] Etkind's answer: Solzhenitsyn fell victim
to "moral maximalism" especially dangerous in the current political
climate. No dissident acts in a vacuum; his choices affect other people
who might suffer gravely after the individual decides to take a heroic ego
trip. [129] Solzhenitsyn, Etkind charged, vastly overestimated the public's
interest in challenging the powers and seriously underestimated the fact
that "the enlightenment must precede [political] renaissance, [that]
underground publications are not sufficient. . . . The first task is to teach,
educate, enlighten. To participate in this centrally important -- indeed the
only relevant activity in our time, we should be ready to conceal thoughts,
yield and maneuver, of course within the morally acceptable limits."
[130] Lakshin's rebuttal to Solzhenitsyn was even more forceful. Lakshin
charged that the imminent author snubbed his colleagues at Novyi Mir,
that his "indifference to means, the psychology of the preventive strike,
cruelty and lying" reflected his prison camp experience, that "Solzhenitsyn
also imbibed the poison of Stalinism," that "the author who addresses us
with his passionate appeal for us to pursue truth, humanity, and goodness
scorns to observe these commandments in his own dealings."

[131] Meanwhile, the liberals in good standing with the government had
to voice their approval when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia
(Novyi Mir publicly endorsed the invasion), look the other way when
Sakharov was forced into exile, keep their outrage to themselves when
the state placed dissidents into psychiatric wards, curse the Communist
party's harebrained economic schemes in the relative privacy of their
home, and rely chiefly on the time-honored "secret freedom" (which was
renamed at the time into "inner freedom") to keep their sanity intact.
Such was the "moral torture," as Etkind put it, that the intelligentsia
suffered after Khrushchev's demise. Soviet intellectuals coping with the
adversity in the pot-Stalinist era reminded one of Spanish Jews forced to
choose between their own traditional faith and official conversion, with
either option entailing a prohibitive cost. Thinking one thing, saying
another, and doing something altogether different, intellectual marronos
populating Soviet society could not help but lose track of their private and
official identities. The recourse to irony seemed natural. "In the
atmosphere of mendacity," remembers a veteran of those years, "allconsuming irony becomes a universal self-defense mechanism." [132] But
in the end, irony and self-parodying did not so much keep apart official
and unofficial selves as helped the individual cover up the snarled web of
his motivation. The burden of affliction from which intellectuals suffered in
post-Stalin's Russia might have been somewhat lighter than the "terrible
ulcer" that sent Chaadaev into depression, and it was probably less
clinically disturbing than the "traumatic psychosis" that disfigured
Nadezhda Mandelstam's generation. Still, it did a lot of damage to the
intellectuals' selfhood, sapped their creative energies, and played havoc
with their private lives.
If the Russian intelligentsia learned anything in the post-Soviet period, it
is to mistrust left radicalism that shaped the 19th century intelligentsia.
The break had not come easily or swiftly. "You see," remembers one
veteran of the era, "for all our irreverent dissidence (inakomyslie), our
hearts responded with emotions to the old [communist] symbols, images,
and commandments which -- miraculously and in spite of everything -retained for us the purity of that original flame." [133] Even seasoned
fighters and internal emigres with no illusions about the regime resorted
to the communist lingo to explained their ways, as did Brodsky during his
1963 trial when the prosecutor pressed him to demonstrate how his life
style jibed with the Soviet people's efforts to build a communist society:
"Building communism is not just operating the machine and plowing the
earth. It is also the work of the intelligentsia which. . ." -- that is as far as
the judge permitted the future Nobel laureate to take his argument.
[134] But by the mid- 70s, when the Brezhnev regime entered the

stagnation years and open dissident voices were brutally silenced, the
liberal intelligentsia began to slip off its socialist moorings. The
preoccupation with moral intelligence inched its way back into existence.
[135] Soviet intellectuals sought moral fortitude in the works of Pushkin
and Chekhov, placing on their agenda "the acquisition of a 'secret
freedom,' the acquisition through one's own intellectual and moral effort."
[136] Camus's "Myth of Sisyphus" captured the intelligentsia's imagination
as emblematic of its hopeless existence amidst official hypocrisy and
corruption. [137] With the increased repressions came thoughts about
emigration (an option that virtually disappeared in the late 70s) and the
longing for the West and faraway cultures. "It was not just political
anecdotes and irreverent songs that sustained us in those years, it was
not just the irony which became the signature trait of our spiritual
makeup, it was also the longing for Paris which we had no chance to see - ever." As before, intellectuals turned their bitterness and anger against
themselves and their loved ones. Moral compromises, forced
voicelessness, the fear of cracking under the KGB pressures -- all these
features explain the ambivalence that post-Stalinist Russia and the
intelligentsia it engendered continue to elicit in intellectuals who lived
through this muddled era.
As for the Russian intellectual culture, it did undergo some changes during
this period. Khrushchev's thaw left an indelible mark on the new
generation of Soviet intellectuals evident in their skepticism about socialist
ideologies, the renewed belief in glasnost as a condition for social
reconstruction, a willingness to take a public stance, the narrowing of the
gap between word and deed. But other features ingrained in the
intelligentsia's collective consciousness -- vanguardism, moral
maximalism, ironic detachment, contempt for meshchanstvo, belief in the
literature's transformative role -- remained largely unaffected. If anything,
violent emotions, self-loathing, and standoffish demeanor were
exacerbated by the situation where one was presented with a clear choice,
albeit an unpalatable one, between the repression awaiting those who
dared to stand up to the powers and closet liberalism that relegated the
morally intelligent person to a moral torture chamber. Lakshin had a point
when he charged his esteemed colleague, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in
reproducing totalitarian stratagems in his own conduct. But did liberal
intellectuals free themselves from this syndrome? The test came as
Mikhail Gorbachev opened up a new and final chapter in Soviet history.
Perestroika and Beyond
Neither "glasnost" nor "perestroika," as we saw earlier, are recent

inventions. Both terms have a long pedigree in Russian intellectual
history. Count Petr Viazemsky, a friend of Pushkin, hailed glasnost and
decried its absence in Russia as early as 1831. [138] Following him,
Herzen, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky, Ivanov-Razumnik, Miliukov and
other Russian intellectuals identified the right to voice one's opinion on the
full range of public issues as indispensable for a healthy society. The same
goes for "perestroika" which was invoked by Russian politically-conscious
intellectuals to highlight the importance of making a radical break with
past beliefs and practices and setting the country on a path toward
political modernization. What made Mikhail Gorbachev's usage different
was that he invoked both terms simultaneously and employed them to
advance a liberal rather than radical political agenda.
The Soviet leader came to power in April of 1985. Within a year he was
talking about the need for glasnost in politics and perestroika in the
economy, but ideological blinkers were still on tight. Few people inside or
outside the Communist party took Gorbachev's musings seriously -- they
saw too many government-instigated campaigns peter out in the past.
Skeptics notwithstanding, the new rhetoric took wing, generating
unprecedented changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. That
perestroika had plenty of substance could no longer be denied once
political prisoners were set free, censorship eased up, political dissent
tolerated, emigration allowed, and disarmament talks pushed beyond all
expectations. The first signs that the intellectuals were taking Gorbachev
seriously came about a year and half into his tenure, as some journalists
tested the limits of glasnost by bringing up topics previously excluded
from public debate. Alexander Vasinsky wrote the pioneering article
bearing the title "The Ballad of the Difference of Opinion" where he urged
that all opinions, including the ones we passionately oppose, be given the
benefit of the doubt. To add extra weight to his argument Vasinsky dug up
a rare quotation from Lenin in which the founder of the Soviet state
chastised those who "spread hatred, intolerance, contempt, etc., toward
dissenters [nesoglasnomysliashchie]." [139] Following Vasinsky, other
intellectuals picked up kindred themes with fewer and fewer references to
the communist luminaries. "One of the conditions of honesty and
directness that our time demands," asserted Sergei Averintsev, a leading
Russian philologist, "is putting an end to the situation where we confuse
the dissenter (nesoglasnyi) with the enemy. The intelligentsia must
nurture in itself the culture of dissent (kultura nesoglasiia), the culture of
debate. I am talking not just about weak tolerance but true respect for the
opponent." [140] "We still do not have enough courage to say 'the king is
naked,'" charged Vladimir Dudintsev in an article denouncing past abuses
in Soviet science. "And this is in spite of the democratic foundations of our

society which requires glasnost, and therefore the freedom to defend
one's views. The final judge in any dispute should be the argument, yet it
is power and connections, I am sad to say, which often decide the
matter." [141]
By 1988, the communist hierarchs realized that Gorbachev's changes had
gone too far and started pressuring him to slow down reforms.
Immediately, the intelligentsia swung into action, claiming an equal
partnership in the reform process. Khrushchev's failure to carry out his
reform, intellectuals maintained, had much to do with his turning his back
on the intelligentsia and neglecting to tap the intellectual resources that
proved indispensable in his earlier struggle with the party hierarchy. The
man who started the political thaw after Stalin's death "paid dearly for his
mistrust and contempt for the intelligentsia," [142] charged Fedor
Burlatsky, a former Khrushchev's aid, in a statement echoed by
many shestidesiatniki. This was a thinly veiled warning to the new
administration to engage the intelligentsia, to make it a full partner in
Gorbachev's reforms. Poet Andrey Voznesensky predicated the success of
social reconstruction on the nation's ability to mobilize its intellectual
resources, to deploy culture and moral intelligence -- two areas in which
Russian intellectuals traditionally claimed a special expertise:
A spiritual revolution is stirring in our land, a life and death struggle for a
new thinking against the still powerful inertia of the past. This is not a
cultural revolution, but a revolution by Culture. . . . Born again is the old
Russian word glasnost, the word that makes active repentance a norm
and that goes back to Tolstoy whose ideal of fighting evil with active
conscience has such resonance today. [143]
Perestroika reignited the old debate about the intelligentsia, its place in
the reform process, the linkage between the old and the new
intelligentsia, and the troubled relationship between the intelligentsia, the
people, and the state. For the first time, the intelligentsia had a chance to
settle old accounts, regale its survival stories, expose the enemies of
nonconformist intellectuals. Many established scholars, writers, and artists
expressed remorse, or were called upon to repent by their colleagues, for
their past actions or inactions. Relishing their newly found freedom and
capitalizing on their access to secret archives, intellectuals delved into
areas once excluded from public discussion: the famines, economic
failures, environmental disasters, forced collectivization, mass purges, the
Gulag culture, persecution of religious and ethnic minorities. . . .
As soon as the first rays of glasnost shined through ideological

obfuscations, the intelligentsia set out to reassert its world-historical
calling and reclaim responsibility for the future. Intellectuals searched
their illustrious pedigree, sought to own up to their past mistakes, and
drew heavily on the Vekhi critique which exposed the Russian
intelligentsia's unsavory practices. Following Chekhov, intellectuals hailed
moral intelligence [intelligentnost] as a defining characteristic for anyone
claiming membership among the intelligentsia's ranks. A highly respected
Russian scholar, Dmitri Likhachev, told an interviewer that "an unschooled
peasant can be called an intelligent, but the same cannot be said about a
ruffian, even if he is burdened with intellect, scientific degrees, and official
honors. . . . For 'Russian intelligent' designates a soulful, moral, rather
than cerebral, category. Better put: unless movement of the heart
precedes movement of thought, a person cannot be called an intelligent."
[144] This wording suggests a shift in focus away from the intelligentsia
as a corporate group that marked the official Soviet perspective and
toward intelligentnost or moral intelligence as a personal disposition and a
pattern of conduct displayed in a particular situation. This theme looms
large in a posthumously published note [145] by A. F. Losev, a celebrated
Russian philosopher, a survivor of numerous campaigns against the
intelligentsia. Losev's article is titled " Ob intelligentnosti ," which could be
freely rendered tus: "On Feeling, Thinking, and Acting as an Intelligent."
In this remarkable piece, the author talks about moral intelligence as a
total way of life and a peculiarly Russian ideology which "appears out of
nowhere, all by itself; it acts without understanding its own action; it
pursues as its end the well-being of humanity, and it does so without
having any clear idea of its actions. The true ideology of true moral
intelligence is naive." The intelligent, goes on Losev, could not be socially
indifferent; he is acutely aware of the world's inanities and is determined
to "transform reality" -- he is a "person who takes the interest of
humanity as his own." Moral intelligence is "conscious spiritual labor to
improve oneself and to make the world around us rational." The
true intelligent is no utopian dreamer; he can critically assess reality, he
knows when to act, when to lay low, where and how to pick up a fight. In
time, moral intelligence becomes self-reflexive and more assertive. The
labor of moral intelligence is the work of reason in history carried out by a
particular individual who fights the day's brush fires with his sight trained
on his destiny, which is to be a civilizing force in history. The life of moral
intelligence is subject to all the vagaries of everyday life, it is tragic,
heroic, and beautiful at the same time.
These ruminations about the intelligentsia's mission in society fall squarely
within the Russian intellectual tradition. The all important difference,
however, is that intelligence is perceived here as a moral agency par

excellence and the intelligentsia is cast as a social force whose mission is
not to drag the unwilling society along the preordained historical path but
to ameliorate it via public discourse and personal example. "Jesus Christ,"
suggested one of the participants in the ongoing debate about the
intelligentsia, "was in essence a prototype of the intelligent." [146] The
latter is akin to an individual who is "born again" and who strives to be
righteous himself rather than to impose a particular scheme on society
(from which it follows that "to call oneself an intelligent is like giving
oneself a medal" [147] ). This and similar statements have familiar
messianic overtones, but they are also refreshing insofar as their critical
thrust is directed at oneself rather than others. Note, however, that the
intelligentsia's commitment to moral means did not slow its enlistment in
government sponsored institutions -- ministries, think-tanks, state
committees, and other organizations that were in the past closed to
Russian intellectuals practicing moral intelligence. Russian intellectuals
took full advantage of the new opportunities. Once intellectuals weaned on
hatred toward the state found themselves working for it, they discovered
that their ideals did not mesh easily with the demands of power. As
Chekhov surmised a century ago, the intelligentsia was hardly immune to
the ills of Russian bureaucracy, from whose head it had origianlly sprang.
The way intellectuals in power acted amidst the rough and tumble of
Russian politics in the Gorbachev's and especially the post-Soviet era,
changed many minds about the intelligentsia's touted virtues.
Never before did the intelligentsia enjoy a greater influence in their
homeland than during the heyday of perestroika. Gorbachev's reforms
assured intellectuals the right to free speech, unprecedented artistic
freedom, wide access to the mass media, the chance to be elected to the
Soviet legislature and to serve in government. In addition to the rights
commonly found in capitalist societies, Russian intellectuals still benefited
from the largely socialist system that guaranteed employment to
everybody, required little work, and subsidized the intelligentsia's creative
pursuits. Thus, throughout perestroika years, movies continued to be
shot, books published, concerts given, research projects publicly funded -all this with little regard for the fact that there might have been no market
for the resulting products. No wonder perestroika received such accolades
from the intelligentsia. "There is no doubt," wrote in 1989 Nathan
Edelman, a well-known Russian historian, "that the intellectuals' support
for perestroika is virtually unanimous." [148] Obviously, things could not
go on like this for any length of time without a major shake-up. And when
reality testing began, the intelligentsia's fortunes sunk fast.
Simply put: glasnost was already perestroika for the intelligentsia. It was

common for intellectuals giddy from reforms to opine that if they had to
chose between glasnost and sausage they would not hesitate to go with
the former and forgo the latter. For economically more vulnerable social
groups, however, perestroika was less of a promise than a threat
mounting daily in the ever-harsh economic environment. The perestroika
movement reached its high-water mark in 1989 when the political forces
in Russia became increasingly polarized. In 1990, the ideological middle
ground seemed to evaporate and Gorbachev's political base shrivelled to a
dangerous point. Whereas his constituents on the left felt irritated by
Gorbachev's refusal to dismantle the one party state, his constituents on
the right urged the return to the relative stability provided by the socialist
economy. A year later, the situation in the country resembled the disarray
that followed the February 1917 revolution. The communist party
stalwarts staged a coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, cracking the
whip one last time to see if the Soviet citizen's old reflexes still worked,
but it was too late. The failed putsch delayed Gorbachev's exit from the
political scene by a few months. The Soviet Union hurtled fast into
oblivion, with nothing left in the tool kit of empire to save it from collapse.
As the Soviet Union went into a tailspin, Boris Yeltsin, head of the Russian
Federation , saw an opportunity to force Gorbachev out of his office: there
was no need for a president in a country that did not exist, he reasoned.
Most Russians seemed to agree. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ceased to function, and herewith began a dramatic reversal of fortunes for
the Russian intelligentsia.
The tales of woe that befell the intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia are
gruesome. The Academy of Science had no money to pay its scholars;
those who could find employment were leaving the country in great
numbers starting in the early 90s, while their less known colleagues had
to look for supplementary employment in the still fragile private sector.
The artistic unions that in the past supported Russian film makers, actors,
writers, painters, musicians and others fortunate enough to belong to the
so-called "creative intelligentsia" had lost their resources and could not
longer furnish their members with lucrative contracts and commissions.
Scores of artistic companies, including the world-famous Bolshoy Ballet,
went into bankruptcy or teetered on the brink. Thick literary journals and
high-brow newspapers that boasted circulation in the millions during
perestroika saw their press runs dwindle to a few thousand copies. The
Russians who used to pride themselves on being a nation of readers,
theater goers, music lovers, and art exhibit aficionados, seemed to have
lost interest in high culture, as attested by empty theaters, poorly
attended shows, unsold books, etc. To add insult to injury, the
intelligentsia was held responsible for every mishap Russia faced since

Gorbachev came to power. And of course there was no longer an
overbearing state to kick around, to blame for the intellectuals'
misfortunes. The state for which the intelligentsia fought tooth and nail
was lying in ruins, with the Russian house of intellect buried under its
rabbles.
The bitterness that the intelligentsia has harbored toward the authorities
is welling up again, though this time its animus is directed against itself. "I
detest being an intellectual," confides Alexander Panchenko, a prominent
Russian scholar and a public thinker with liberal credentials. [149]Another
well-known writer, Alexander Ivanov, tells the interviewer who dared to
address him as an intelligent: "Please do not call me with this disgusting
word. I never considered myself an intelligent and always viewed this
term with contempt." [150] If Lenin ever was right, adds Ivanov, it was in
his assessment of the intelligentsia as the nation's excrement. Sergei
Govorukhin, a film critic, concurs with this assessment, and so do several
other writers with the Slavophile leanings and the desire to restore Russia
's former glory. The anger enciphered in such statements has raised the
temperature of the debate about the intelligentsia which, sadly, fell into
the old habit of showering opponents with sarcasm and humiliating
remarks. It is as if the Russian intellectual culture was suddenly thrown
back to its beginnings. The situation is hardly helped by the fact that now
everyone is free to say whatever one wants to say and everybody is
talking simultaneously without much regard for the opponent or a
concerted effort to join issues. The bloody confrontation between Yeltsin's
government and the recalcitrant Russian Parliament in October of 1992
amplified to a deafening point over-acidulous invectives the Russian
intellectuals were trading ever since the Soviet Union's demise. The whole
situation is eerily reminiscent of the emotional malaise that afflicted the
Russian intelligentsia after each previous revolution and that provoked the
Vekhi authors' monumental inquiry into the Russian intelligentsia's
wayward life style. "Nine-tenths of our intelligentsia is afflicted with
neurasthenia," wrote Mikhail Gershenson, one of the sanest voices in
Russian intellectual history, whose insight rings true today as it did ninety
years ago; "there are almost no normal people among us -- everybody is
acerbic, withdrawn, restless faces contorted in a grimace, either because
one was crossed or because one was saddened. . . . We infect each other
with bitterness and have so much saturated the atmosphere with our
neurasthenic attitudes toward life that a fresh person, say, the one who
lived for a while abroad, could not help feeling suffocated in our midst."
[151]
It is all the more important to discern amidst this din the voices that heed

Chekhov's call to civility and emotional sanity. Sergei Averintsev, Dmitri
Likhachev, Marietta Chudakova, Viktor Sheinis, Yuri Levada -- these are
just a few respected voices among today's intelligentsia which use
glasnost not to drown the opponents' views but to further dialogue and
which continue to urge the return to sanity in public discourse. What
draws these very different authors together is the realization that there is
more to democracy than constitutional guarantees and representative
institutions, that civil society begins with civility, that Russia will continue
on its downward path until its citizens can see that, to paraphrase John
Dewey, democracy does literally begin at home. Marietta Chudakova's
article published in Literaturnaia Gazeta on the eve of the Soviet Union 's
collapse is as good an example of a clear-headed attitude toward the
current chaotic situation in Russia as you can find in recent literature.
Chudakova reminds her readers about Olga Fridenberg, a friend of Boris
Pasternak and a keen student of ancient Greek literature, who had this to
say about Russian intellectual culture shortly before she died in 1956:
Everywhere, in all organizations and homes, a nasty squabble [ skloka] is
raging on, the poisoned fruit of our social order, a new concept hitherto
unknown to civilization and untranslatable into any other language. It is
hard to explain what it really is: a mean-spirited, petty rivalry, venomous
factionalism that sickens all against each, an unscrupulous envy that
breeds endless intrigues. It is sycophancy, libel, informers, the desire to
unseat the rival, deliberate feeding of ugly passions, nerves perpetually
set on edge, and moral degeneration that makes a person or a group run
amok. Squabble is a natural state for people who are rubbing against each
other in a dungeon, helpless to resist the dehumanization they have been
subjected to. Squabble -- is the alpha and omega of our politics. Squabble
-- is our methodology. [152]
The irritability, intolerance, and aggressive demeanor obvious today,
Chudakova argues, stem from the old habits intellectuals are unable to
shed. Now that the ideological husks are peeled away, the raw anger and
bitterness are no longer hiding under the veneer of respectability and
politeness. The difference between the past and present discourse,
according to Kama Ginkas, a stage director, is the same as between "a
philosophical chat at a fire-side and philosophizing with your thumbs
slammed in door jambs." [153] The need to pour the bitter irony and
sarcasm on the opponent is even more painfully obvious today than in
Russia 's recent past. Rassadin calls it "slovenly irony," Poliakov laments
"the total ironism" pervading today's Russian culture, and Shvedov decries
"endless jocularity, coy and empty irony" filling the pages of literary
magazines. [154] Add to this the devastating impact that market pursuits

have had on old friendships, the loss of relatives, colleagues, and friends
to emigration, the precipitous decline in public's interest in high culture,
persistent economic uncertainty, anti-intellectualism fanned by the
political right -- and you will have the picture of a malaise that plagues the
intelligentsia's psyche. [155] It is as if someone suddenly removed
ferment from the perestroika brew, causing the drink to go sour and
giving imbibers a monstrous headache. Intercut with the feeling of
bitterness wide-spread among the Russian intelligentsia today is the
nostalgia for the good-bad-old days before perestroika when its members
knew exactly what they were fighting against and for, when people clung
onto every word uttered by an artist, when there was hope. The empire's
vices, including the hated censorship, the necessity to speak an Aesopian
language and create with no chance to have an audience, now appear to
some to be hidden virtues. [156] Not surprisingly, Alexander Pushkin's
verse on Pindemonti is quoted ad nausea, its author is portrayed as
"perhaps the freest man in Russia 's entire history," [157] and his "secret
freedom" is touted as the last refuge of the intelligent.
Is this the beginning of the end for the Russian intelligentsia, as many
authors inside and outside Russia argue? After all, this ideological order
has accomplished its main goals: the overbearing Russian state is cut
down to size, political absolutism is broken, glasnost reigns supreme, and
Russia is firmly set on its path toward political modernization. As a
historical force bearing the birthmark of its premodern origins, the
intelligentsia must yield the center stage to make room for professional
politicians, market-conscious artists, and state bureaucrats. But its
historical mission has not been accomplished yet. There is still the
unfinished agenda of psychological modernization, of developing civic
culture that the intelligentsia has to take up, and that calls for moral as
well as emotional intelligence.
Georgy Fedotov saw silence, quietude, holding back one's feelings as a
signature trait of Russia 's spirituality. [158] Much of what is valuable in
Russian culture, he maintained, comes from this emotional and intellectual
wound-up already evident in early Russian monks. As I have tried to show
in my chapter, such voicelessness has a darker side. For much too often it
has been an involuntary, forced silence that deprived humans
of glasand glasnost, drove their negative feelings inside, and turned their
anguish on themselves and others. The emotional abuse that Russian
intellectuals casually heap on each other these days is a sure sign that
they and their predecessors were themselves abused. All those who had
gone through Stalinist purges, were intimidated by the KGB, witnessed
ideologically inspired violence could not help being deeply troubled by

their experiences. The Russian intelligentsia's frustrations go back for
centuries and are fuelled by an intellectual culture whose participants had
their feet to the fire until they agreed to say things repugnant to their
conscience. Herein lies the hidden cesspool fouling Russia 's intellectual
life.
Contrary to the intellectuals' belief that Pushkin was the freest man in
Russia and that his "secret freedom" is all that the true intelligent needs
to be happy, Pushkin was a troubled man who was badly hurt by others
and in turn hurt many people about him. His inner freedom underscored
his longing for basic rights -- to express oneself, to move freely, to choose
his own fate -- the birthmark longing of a Russian intellectual. B.
Kistiakovsky, one of the Vekhi authors, exposed the intelligentsia's
tendency to juxtapose inner freedom and legal liberty nearly a century
ago: "But inner freedom, immediate spiritual freedom, can be realized
only under the conditions of external freedom -- the latter is the best
school for the former." [159] The disregard for human rights and legal
guarantees breeds moral maximalism, rabid intellectualism, and emotional
violence. Common among Russian intellectuals, these qualities reflect a
country disfigured by absolutism, a country which drags its people into
distorted communications against their will, forces them to say things they
do not mean and cover up their insincerity by irony and sarcasm. No
intellectual prowess makes up for deficient emotional intelligence in
everyday settings; no concern for the well-being of humanity justifies
callousness toward people in our immediate surroundings; no inner
freedom exonerates a person from the responsibility for his conduct; no
ethical commitment absolves one from the need to respect law. When
these common sense precepts are routinely violated, the community
suffers, everyone is in distress.
The collective howling we hear today in Russia bears more than a fleeting
resemblance to the post-traumatic stress syndrome common among
people who went through harrowing experiences and who failed to come
to grips with what they felt at the time because their feelings were
deemed to be worthless and politically incorrect. Russian intellectual
culture continues to evolve; there is much in it that is precious; it contains
models of rational, moral, and emotional intelligence that could help
Russian intellectuals rid themselves of the regnant obsessions and find the
via media between facile intellectualism and emotional excess. The
direction in which Russian intellectual culture has been evolving in the last
few years, however, gives a cause for concern. It might not be indicative
of the nation's long-term future, but it is sure to complicate the healing
process. Still, the very fact that intellectuals are finally free to express

their feelings, however distorted these might be, is progress. Everything
that helps bring these pent-up feelings into the open and channel them
into an intelligent discourse should be welcome. The agenda for the day is
to focus the intelligentsia's attention on its own emotional life, to help it
comprehend the distorted communications behind Russian intellectual
culture, to make it understand that democracy is also a certain quality of
experience, a socio-psychological culture outside of which democratic
institutions could not sink roots and are sure to wilt away. In short, one
has to balance intellect with emotional intelligence and see to it that our
emotions are intelligent and our intellect is emotionally sane. [160]
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